Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Criminal Law by Decker, Marla Graff & McLees, John Hills, Jr.
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 32 | Issue 4 Article 6
1998
Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Criminal Law
Marla Graff Decker
John Hills McLees Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Richmond Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Marla G. Decker & John H. McLees Jr., Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Criminal Law, 32 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1091 (1998).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol32/iss4/6
CRIMINAL LAW
Marla Graff Decker*
John Hill McLees, Jr.**
I. INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE
This article summarizes all published criminal law decisions
of the Supreme Court of Virginia and the major criminal law
decisions of the Virginia Court of Appeals sitting en banc, is-
sued between July 1, 1997, and July 1, 1998. Due to space
limitations, however, the article includes only a few selected
published panel opinions of the Virginia Court of Appeals. Also,
this article includes a summary df the criminal law opinion
from the Supreme Court of the United States which arose from
a Virginia case during the period stated above. And finally, this
article summarizes the most significant enactments from the
1998 session of the Virginia General Assembly in the field of
criminal law.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Fourth Amendment-Search and Seizure
1. Expectation of Privacy
In Johnson v. Commonwealth,' a panel of the Virginia Court
of Appeals reversed a trial court's finding that the defendant
-had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the place where he
stored evidence later used to incriminate him.
* Assistant Attorney General, Commonwealth of Virginia. BA, 1980, Gettysburg
College; J.D., 1983, University of Richmond School of Law.
** Assistant Attorney General, Commonwealth of Virginia. BA, 1969, University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; J.D., 1976, University of Richmond School of Law.
1. 26 Va. App. 674, 496 S.E.2d 143 (Ct. App. 1998).
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The defendant was an Accomack County waterman who,
together with several other watermen, co-leased a warehouse
and an adjacent dock for the purpose of off-loading fish from
their boats and packing them for shipment to the market. A
Virginia Marine Resources Commission officer came onto the
dock without a search warrant and observed several untagged
striped bass, in violation of state law, on Johnson's boat. The
evidence showed that, in order to come onto the dock, the offi-
cer had to go through an opening in a fence clearly marked
with "no trespassing" signs and past an occupied business of-
fice. The area was not open to the public and, except by invita-
tion, no one other than the co-lessees came onto the property.
Although all of the co-lessees had authority to invite outsiders
onto the property, none had invited the officer on this occa-
sion.2
The trial court overruled Johnson's motion to suppress, find-
ing that, because both Johnson and his co-lessees allowed out-
siders onto the property for various reasons and because the
fish were in plain view from the dock and from the navigable
waters of the creek, Johnson had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the place where they were found.' The
Commonwealth's Attorney agreed that the "administrative
search" exception to the warrant requirement did not apply.4
On appeal, the Commonwealth was not allowed to argue the
"administrative search" exception, because it had disclaimed
reliance on that rationale in the trial court.5 The court of ap-
peals reviewed the law of curtilage and open fields, then implic-
itly found that the dock constituted part of the curtilage of the
warehouse.6 The court ruled that Johnson had a reasonable
expectation of privacy from searches by those whom his co-les-
sees had not invited onto the property, and that the officer had
no right to be present in the location where she had first seen
the untagged fish.'
2. See id. at 678-79, 496 S.E.2d at 145.
3. See id. at 676-77, 496 S.E.2d at 144.
4. See id. at 683, 496 S.E.2d at 147.
5. See id.
6. See id. 496 S.E.2d at 149.
7. See id. at 687, 496 S.E.2d at 149.
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2. Consensual Encounters, Investigatory Stops, and Probable
Cause
The issues before the Supreme Court of Virginia in Parker v.
Commonwealth' were whether an encounter between a police
officer and a pedestrian constituted a seizure under the Fourth
Amendment and, if so, whether the seizure was constitutionally
permissible. Three uniformed police officers driving a marked
police vehicle in a public housing project were "checking various
areas... for drug activity."9 As they drove down a street in
the housing development, the officers saw "a group of men
'standing around a white Cadillac which had its trunk open." °
The officer driving the police car had made numerous narcotics
arrests in the area and had recovered drugs and weapons in
the immediate area where these men and the vehicle were
located. The area was known to the officer as an "open-air drug
market."1 When the officer drove the police car near the vehi-
cle in question, the men looked toward the police car, shut the
vehicle's trunk, and began to disperse. The two officers that
were passengers in the police car exited the police car. The
officer driving remained in the police car and watched the men
disperse. He saw the defendant "turn and place an item with
his right hand in the waistband of his shorts."' The defendant
continued to walk in a direction away from the Cadillac."3
While the two other officers remained stationary near the
Cadillac, the officer in the police car "backed the police vehicle
up" and drove down the road following the defendant. 4 The
officer drove the police car alongside the defendant who -was
about twenty feet away. The officer looked at the defendant
who w~s th6n looking in the direction of the police'car. The
defendant turned around and started walking back on the side-
walk in the other direction. The officer continued to follow the
defendant who began to walk on "posted" property owned by a
8. 255 Va. 96, 496 S.E.2d 47 (1998).
9. Id. at 99, 496 S.E.2d at 49 (citations omitted).
10. Id. (citation omitted).
11. Id.
12. Id. (citation omitted).
13. See id.
14. Id.
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housing authority. The officer drove the police car forty feet off
of the street onto the housing authority's property and stopped
the police car where the defendant was standing.5
The officer, whose weapons were clearly visible, approached
the defendant and asked whether he lived in that housing de-
velopment. The defendant stopped and responded by telling the
officer that he did not reside there. The officer then asked the
defendant if he had any guns or drugs in his possession, and
the defendant replied, "no." Finally, the officer asked the defen-
dant if the officer could "pat him down," and the defendant put
his hands up in the air. The officer patted the defendant down
for weapons or drugs and found none. 6
A second officer approached and asked the defendant, who
was wearing white mesh shorts and a pair of thin white or
peach boxer underwear if he "had anything in his crotch."
The defendant said that he did not and "grabbed his basketball
shorts and boxer shorts and started, in very exaggerated mo-
tions, pulling them to the side, up and down, shaking them in
and out."8 As the defendant was making these motions, the
initial officer saw "a pink object through the boxer shorts mate-
rial."9 "The officer placed his hand on the object and realized
that it was crack cocaine."0 He removed the item from the
defendant's waistband. The item was a sandwich bag containing
eighteen red ziplock baggies, each containing crack cocaine.2'
The Supreme Court of Virginia affied the defendant's con-
viction,22 but curiously provided no majority opinion. Inasmuch
as four justices concurred only in the result of the case, the
opinion of the supreme court represented the. views of only
three justices. In its opinion, the court found that when the
uniformed police officer, who had been following the defendant
from the moment he left the Cadillac, pulled the police car. off
the roadway onto the housing authority property and stopped
15. See id.
16. See id. at 99-100, 496 S.E.2d at 49.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 100, 496 S.E.2d at 49.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 107, 496 S.E.2d at 53.
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the car where the defendant was standing, the defendant effec-
tively was seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.' The
supreme court held that the police officer's acts constituted a
show of authority which restrained the defendant's liberty and,
as such, it was a seizure.'
The supreme court went on, however, to evaluate whether
the seizure was reasonable under the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Terry v. Ohio.' The court found that based
upon the facts and circumstances of the case at the time of the
seizure, the officer had a "reasonable suspicion, based on objec-
tive facts, that the defendant was engaged in criminal activi-
ty.' The defendant was with a group of men in an "open-air
drug market" where the officer had made numerous drug ar-
rests and had recovered drugs and weapons. When the men
saw the police, they closed the trunk of the car and dispersed.
Furthermore, the, officer saw the defendant place an object in
the waistband of his shorts. Based upon that evidence, the
supreme court found that the officer had a "particularized and
objective basis" for suspecting that the defendant was involved
in criminal activity.'
The court also found that the officer was justified in reaching
into the defendant's boxer shorts and seizing the crack
cocaine.' The court held that the officer had probable cause to
believe that the defendant had committed a crime when the
officer reached into the shorts to retrieve the object he believed
to be crack cocaine.' In addition to all of the facts which justi-
fied the seizure, the officer testified that he knew from person-
nel experience that "people often try to hide contraband in their
shorts, in their crotch area or in their buttocks area."" The
officer also knew that "[p]ink baggies are often one of the colors
of baggies used to package ... crack cocaine."3 When asked
by the second officer whether he had anything in his crotch, the
23. See id. at 102, 496 S.E.2d at 51.
24. See id.
25. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
26. Parker, 255 Va. at 104, 496 S.E.2d at 52.
27. Id. at 105, 496 S.E.2d at 52.
28. See id. at 104, 496 S.E.2d at 53.
29. See id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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defendant grabbed the waistbands of both his shorts and box-
ers, and maneuvered them "in an apparent effort to prevent the
crack from falling to the ground." 2 The supreme court found
that based upon all of this evidence, the officer had probable
cause to seize the contraband.3
In Ewell v. Commonwealth,34 the issue before the Supreme
Court of Virginia was whether the stop and detention of the
defendant was reasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amend-
ment. An off-duty police officer, hired by a particular apartment
complex to work as a security officer to enforce the complex's
policy against trespassing, drove his marked police vel icle into
the complex parking lot. As the officer entered the lot, he saw a
vehicle, which he did not recognize as one belonging to a resi-
dent, parked next to an apartment that was suspected of being
the site of narcotics activity. The officer was concerned because
it was "very early and the car was parked in an area suspected
of 'high narcotics' trafficking."35 The driver of the car attempt-
ed to leave the parking lot immediately upon the officer's arriv-
al. As the vehicle approached, the officer did not recognize the
driver as a resident of the apartment complex. Thus, he wanted
to stop the vehicle to inquire whether the driver was trespass-
ing.3 6
The vehicle already had exited the parking lot and was on a
public street. The officer followed the vehicle out, activated his
flashing blue lights, and stopped the car. The officer approached
the car, determined that defendant Ewell was the operator, and
then, using his flashlight, "saw a beer can that had been fash-
ioned in such a way that it gave the appearance of something
that would be used, in [the officer's] experience, to smoke crack
cocaine."3 ' The officer explained the appearance in detail and
why he believed that it was used as a crack pipe. The officer
also saw a wooden clothespin charred at one end in an open
purse. The officer testified that it was his experience that such
32. Id.
33. See id.
34. 254 Va. 214, 491 S.E.2d 721 (1997).
35. Id. at 216, 491 S.E.2d at 722.
36. See id.
37. Id.
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an item commonly was used to hold a crack pipe when it be-
came too hot to hold with one's hand.38
The defendant admitted to the officer that the purse belonged
to her and that he would find a crack pipe inside. The officer
searched the purse and found two homemade crack pipes that
ultimately tested positive for cocaine. 9
The supreme court reversed Ewell's conviction and found that
the trial court erred by refusing to suppress the evidence.'
The court held that the police officer did not have a reasonable
suspicion that Ewell may have been trespassing or engaging in
any other criminal activity.4' The court found that despite the
fact that the officer did not recognize Ewell or Ewell's vehicle,
which was parked in a high narcotic activity area, the fact that
the vehicle silnply left upon the arrival of the marked police .car
was not suspicious conduct.42 Thus, the supreme court held
that the facts did not provide the officer with the basis for a
legitimate investigatory stop.'
In Polston v. Commonwealth,4" the Supreme Court of Virgin-
ia considered whether marijuana, found during lasearch of the
defendant's apartment pursuant to a warrant, should have been
suppressed as the fiuit of an unlawful search. A police detective
obtained a warrant for a search of the defendant's apartment
after he and an unidentified informant appeared before a mag-
istrate.45 The detective represented in his affidavit to the mag-
istrate that, on that date, a "citizen" informant appeared before
the magistrate and stated that within the past seventy-two
hours he or she observed a quantity of marijuana being stored
as well as being offered for sale at the particular identified
apartment.4
In support of the informant's credibility and reliability, the.
affidavit stated that the informant appeared before the magis-
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 217, 491 S.E.2d at 723.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. 255 Va. 500, 498 S.E.2d 924 (1998).
45. See id. at 501, 498 S.E.2d at 925.
46. See id. at 501-02, 498 S.E.2d at 925.
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trate under oath and after being advised of the penalty for
peijury. The informant chose to remain anonymous for fear of
retaliation. The affidavit represented that the affiant had been
a police officer for more than six years, was currently assigned
to the Vice and Narcotics Unit of his jurisdiction, had made
several drug arrests, and was familiar with the drug culture in
and around his jurisdiction.4"
In making the decision to issue a search warrant for the
defendant's apartment, "the magistrate questioned the infor-
mant under oath, and the informant stated that he was famil-
iar with the local drug culture and that he had .used marijuana
at least once a week for a number of years."48 In light of the
"informant's sworn testimony, the magistrate or the detective
added to the affidavit that "[t]his citizen is a self-admitted drug
user and is familiar with the drug culture in and-around [the
County where the defendant's apartment is -located]."49 The
magistrate then issued the search warrant. Subsequently, the
police found about a pound of marijuana in the defendant's
bedroom dresser. She told the police that she sold marijuana.0
The defendant argued on appeal that the magistrate did not
have a substantial basis to find probable cause necessary for
the issuance of a search warrant because the "citizen" referred
to in the affidavit was arrested by the police just prior to pro-
viding them with the information. The detective also made no
effort to investigate or verify either the informant's credibility
or the reliability of the information contained in the warrant.5'
The supreme court, applying the "good faith exception" to the
exclusionary rule set forth by the United States Supreme Court
in United States v. Leon5" found that regardless of the validity
of the search warrant, the evidence seized during the search of
the defendant's apartment was admissible and the trial court's
ruling was correct.53
47. See id.
48. Id. at 502, 498 S.E.2d at 925.
49. Id.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 502-03, 498 S.E.2d at 925.
52. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
53. See Polston, 255 Va. at 503, 498 S.E.2d at 925.
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The supreme court recognized the four occasions when sup-
pression of evidence, despite the existence of a search warrant,
is required. First, the supreme court noted that the evils identi-
fied in the Leon test were not present in this case. Second, the
court found that the police officers acted in good faith when
they searched the apartment under the authority of an appar-
ently valid search warrant.' Third, the court held that the
magistrate neither abandoned his judicial role nor was misled
by information in the affidavit.55 In fact, according to the
court, "the magistrate questioned the informant about the
informant's knowledge of drug activity" in the involved coun-
ty.' Finally, the Supreme Court noted that the warrant was
neither facially deficient, nor "so lacking in indicia of probable
cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unrea-
sonable."57 Thus, applying the "good faith exception" to the
exclusionary rule, the supreme court affirmed the decision of
the Virginia Court of Appeals.
In McGee v. Commonwealth," the Virginia Court of Appeals
found that the defendant's encounter with the police was not
consensual, thus triggering Fourth Amendment scrutiny. The
court of appeals also concluded that at the time of the search of
the defendant, the police did not have a reasonable suspicion
based upon articulable facts to suspect the defendant of crimi-
nal activity, and consequently, the search was improper.59 The
court's rulings were very fact-specific, based on the unique
circumstances of this case.
In this case, police received a radio dispatch from an anony-
mous informant, providing the description of a male who was
selling drugs on a particular street corner. About two minutes
after the call was dispatched, police arrived in the area. No one
was at the street corner, but the defendant was sitting on a
nearby porch. Three armed, uniformed police officers in two
marked police cars pulled up to a sidewalk, got out of the vehi-
cles, and approached the defendant. One officer told the defen-
54. See id. at 504, 498 S.E.2d at 926.
55. See id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 25 Va. App. 193, 487 S.E.2d 259 (Ct. App. 1997) (en banc).
59. See id. at 196, 487 S.E.2d at 260.
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dant that he had received a report that the defendant "was on
this corner selling drugs and [that he] matched the description"
of the reported drug dealer.' The officer, in the same tone of
voice that he used in court, asked the defendant if he could pat
him down to ensure that he did not have any weapons on his
person. The defendant stood up and extended his arms in front
of him with both fists clinched. The officer patted him down,
but found no weapons. The officer believed that the defendant
could have been holding a small knife or razor blade in his
closed fists; therefore, he asked the defendant to open his
hands. The defendant did so and revealed some money, a torn
ziplock bag, and a piece of crack cocaine.61
The court of appeals stated that, in analyzing whether a
police-citizen encounter is consensual, the court looks to the
totality of the circumstances to determine whether "a ieason-
able person would have believed that he or she was not free to
leave." The court reasoned that "[w]hen the police expressly
inform an individual that they have received information that
the individual is engaging in criminal activity, the police 'con-
-vey a message that compliance with their request is required.'
This is a significant fact "among the 'totality of the
circumstances' to determine whether a reasonable person would
feel free to leave.'
The court of appeals noted that whether the encounter is
consensual or amounts to a seizure is determined on a case-by-
case basis.' The court went on, however, to hold that in this
case the officer's statement did not simply "convey a message
that the officers were conducting a general investigation in
response to a report of drug dealing," but targeted the defen-
dant as the subject of the investigation.' Moreover, the three
armed, uniformed police officers arrived in two marked police
cars and immediately approached the defendant. The court
found that "[t]he unmistakable message conveyed to the defen-
dant was that the officers had reason to suspect that he was
60. Id.
61. See id. at 196-97, 487 S.E.2d at 261.
62. Id. at 199-200, 487 S.E.2d at 262.
63. Id. (citations omitted).
64. See id.
65. Id. at 201, 487 S.E.2d at 263 (emphasis in original).
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selling drugs and that they were detaining him to investigate
his activity.' Thus, a reasonable person would have believed
that he or she was being detained and that there was no option
but to submit to the pat down and open his or her hands."
In addition to finding that the defendant was seized by the
police based upon their show of authority, the court determined
that at the time of the seizure the officer did not have a rea-
sonable suspicion of criminal activity that was based upon
articulable facts in order to support an investigatory stop.'
The anonymous tip was not supported by any independent ob-
servations by the police. The court of appeals found that "[a]t
most,... [the officer] only knew that the defendant may have
fit the description of the person that the anonymous tipster
observed." 9 The officers did not see any furtive gestures or
suspicious behavior on the part of the defendant and nothing
suggested that the defendant was engaged in criminal behavior.
Consequently, the court of appeals concluded that seizure was
unlawful and the evidence should have been suppressed. °
In White v. Commonwealth," the Virginia Court of Appeals
affirmed the defendant's conviction for possession of cocaine
with the intent to distribute. The significant issue before the
court was whether the officers had a lawful basis to seize the
defendant and conduct a warrantless search of his person."
Three police officers were on duty one evening, patrolling
together in a police car. They saw a group of five to ten males
standing in a semicircle. One man had his back to the street,
facing the other men. The group was standing next to a Cadil-
lac, which one of the officers recognized as belonging to the
defendant. As the officers approached, they heard someone
shout, "5-0,' a street term for police."73 The man who had been
facing the group turned to look and the same officer who had
recognized the car recognized the defendant. The group of men
66. Id.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 202, 487 S.E.2d at 263 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
69. Id. at 203, 487 S.E.2d at 264.
70. See id.
71. 25 Va. App. 662, 492 S.E.2d 451 (Ct. App. 1997) (en bane).
72. See id. at 664, 492 S.E.2d at 452.
73. Id.
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ran, leaving the Cadillac with its motor running and a door
wide open. The officer who recognized the defendant watched as
the defendant ran with his hand clenched in a fist. The officer
saw him make a downward motion and open his fist. "A large
white object fell from his hand and onto the ground."74 One
officer went to retrieve the object while the other two officers
followed the group of men who ran behind the residences. The
two officers found the defendant sitting on the back steps of
one of the houses.75
The officers made the defendant stand up and patted him
down for weapons. The officer who knew him radioed for a
warrant check. Another officer, who had gone to where he saw
the defendant drop the object, found what he believed to be
cocaine and asked the officer over the radio if he had custody of
the defendant. After receiving an affirmative response, that
officer told the other officers to bring the defendant around to
the front because he had the "dope" that the defendant
dropped. The defendant was arrested based upon the cocaine
that the officer saw him drop. A stocking cap with $581.00 in
various denominations and a pager were found on the
defendant's person. An officer saw "shavings" on the floorboard
and seat of the Cadillac, which he believed to be crack cocaine.
Also, a digital scale was found inside the vehicle. The defendant
subsequently made a statement to the police.76
The court of appeals found that when the two officers initial-
ly detained the defendant, the act was authorized as an investi-
gatory stop under Terry v. Ohio.7 Likewise, the initial "frisk"
was authorized because the officers saw a group of men gath-
ered around a car late on a winter evening.7 As the police ap-
proached, they heard someone yell out a slang word for police
and the group ran, abandoning the car leaving one of its doors
wide open and its engine running. The two officers that chased
the group found the defendant sitting on a porch despite the
time of year and hour of the night. One of the officers recog-
nized him from "previous encounters" and radioed for a warrant
74. Id. at 664-65, 492 S.E.2d at 452.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 665, 492 S.E.2d at 452-53.
77. See id. at 666, 492 S.E.2d at 453 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
78. See id.
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check. The court of appeals found that all of this evidence sup-
ported the two officers' reasonable suspicion that the group of
men had been engaged in criminal activity and that the defen-
dant was a "member of the group."79 Thus, the initial deten-
tion and frisk challenged by the defendant were lawful.0
In Moore v. Commonwealth,"' the Virginia Court of Appeals
affirmed the defendant's convictions for a second offense of
possession of heroin with intent to distribute and conspiracy to
possess heroin with intent to distribute. 2 In addition to find-
ing that the evidence in this case was sufficient to support the
defendant's conspiracy conviction, the court held that the frisk
of the defendant, who was the passenger in a legitimately
stopped vehicle, was reasonable and did not violate his Fourth
Amendment rights.'
The court of appeals, recognizing society's "paramount" con-
cern for the safety of police officers, found that the officer was
justified in frisking the defendant. The minimal intrusion asso-
ciated with a frisk was outweighed by the legitimate concern
for police safety."
In this case, the Virginia State Trooper stopped a vehicle for
speeding. The stop occurred on an interstate highway bridge.
The bridge did not have a pedestrian walkway. In addition to
the driver of the vehicle, the defendant was the front seat pas-
senger and there was another passenger in the back seat. The
trooper was alone. 'The driver of the vehicle could not produce
an operatoes license or the registration for the vehicle. All
three occupants denied ownership of the car. The trooper took
the driver to the police car because he had no proof of identifi-
cation. The defendant and the other passenger remained in the
car. The defendant told the trooper that the driver was "not
who he said he was."' The trooper arrested the driver for
forgery and handcuffed him.8
79. Id at 666, 492 S.E.2d at 454.
80. See id. at 666-67, 492 S.E.2d at 454.
81. 25 Va. App. 277, 487 S.E.2d 864 (Ct. App. 1997).
82. See id.
83. See id at 283-86, 487 S.E.2d at 867-68.
84. See id. at 286-87, 487 S.E.2d at 868-69.
85. Id. at 281, 487 S.E.2d at 866.
86. See id.
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The trooper asked the two passengers to get out of the vehi-
cle. Each acknowledged that he did not have a valid driver's li-
cense, and the back seat passenger appeared to be under the
influence "of something" and unable to drive. The trooper had
"a bad feeling about' the situation" and was waiting for his
backup to arrive." The trooper told the passengers that be-
cause the driver was under arrest and no one else could drive
the car, he was going to have the car inventoried and then
towed. He also told them that, in accordance with police proce-
dure, he intended to remove them from the interstate highway.
The trooper frisked them for weapons to ensure his safety while
he was inventorying the vehicle and transporting them to a
safe place off of the highway.
During the frisk, "the trooper detected and removed from...
[the defendant's] pocket an unsheathed syringe, which con-
tained a clear, white liquid."" s After the defendant denied be-
ing a diabetic, the trooper arrested him for possession of drug
paraphernalia. The trooper then searched the defendant inci-
dent to that arrest and found a "bag containing ninety-nine
small, blue glassine bags of heroin." 9
The defendant challenged the frisk of his person, but the
court of appeals found that the frisk was proper because the
events which unfolded created a situation "fraught with poten-
tial danger" for the officer, which justified the minimal intru-
sion of a frisk.' ° The court noted that the trooper was required
to inventory the vehicle. Moreover, he could not leave the two
passengers, neither of which could legally drive the vehicle, on
the bridge or on the highway. State police policy required the
trooper to conduct a pat-down for weapons to ensure the
officer's safety before transporting them because the police car
has no barrier between the front and rear seats. Based upon all
of the facts, the court of appeals found that the frisk was rea-
sonable.9
87. Id. at 282, 487 S.E.2d at 866.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 286-87, 487 S.E.2d at 868-69.
91. See id. at 287, 487 S.E.2d at 869.
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In Jefferson v. Commonwealth,92 the Virginia Court of Ap-
peals reversed the defendant's conviction for possession of co-
caine. The court found that although the police had probable
cause to believe that the defendant had committed a criminal
offense, the officer could not effect the arrest without a warrant
because the officer had to go onto the defendant's porch which
is the curtilage of his home.9"
The court of appeals found that, based upon information
provided by two informants, the officer had probable cause to
believe that the defendant recently had committed a criminal
offense." The court held that the reliability of the informants
was "established by their asserted first-hand knowledge, their
independent corroboration of each other's observations, and one
of the informant's history of providing accurate information to
the police." 5 The first informant, whom the officer had known
for about a month, told him about the defendant and others
selling cocaine at a particular location. The officer sent a second
proven reliable informant to "see what was going on" at that
location.' The second informant reported the same detailed
information that had been provided by the first informant. The
court of appeals found that based upon the totality of the cir-
cumstances, the lead officer and all of those officers whom he
briefed prior to their arrival at the location, which included the
arresting officer, had probable cause to arrest the defendant."
Despite its finding of probable cause to arrest, the court of
appeals held that the arrest was "unlawful because it was exe-
cuted within the 'curtilage' of his home without a warrant."
The porch was in close proximity to the defendant's house. The
back door from which the defendant exited the house when ar-
rested opened "'directly' into the backyard."99 The defendant
was right outside the door and the officer had to walk behind
the house before he could see the defendant.
92. 27 Va. App. 1, 497 S.E.2d 474 (Ct. App. 1998).
93. See id. at 17-18, 497 S.E.2d at 482.
94. See id. at 13, 497 S.E.2d at 480.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 7, 497 S.E.2d at 477.
97. See id. at 14, 497 S.E.2d at 480.
98. Id. at 14, 497 S.E.2d at 480.
99. Id. at 17, 497 S.E.2d at 482.
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According to the court of appeals, the "area of a residential
backyard immediately adjacent" to the back door of the resi-
dence is an area accepted as one "to which the activity of home
life extends."' The court of appeals found that because the
defendant was arrested at a location "so intimately tied to the
home," he "could reasonably expect it to be treated as a part of
his home."'01 Furthermore, the court asserted that nothing in
the record suggested that the officer's intrusion into the curti-
lage was justified by exigent circumstances, nor that the defen-
dant consented to his entry. Thus, the court concluded that
because the officer entered the curtilage of the defendant's
home without a warrant, the arrest was unlawful.' 2
In Neal v. Commonwealth,' the Virginia Court of Appeals
found that when a police officer observes repeated weaving by a
vehicle within a lane of traffic, the officer may have a reason-
able and articulable suspicion that the driver is impaired so as
to justify an investigatory stop. 4 In this case of first im-
pression, the court of appeals concluded, "[w]e agree with our
sister states that weaving within a single traffic lane is an
articulable fact which may give rise to a reasonable suspicion of
illegal activity."0 5 The court also recognized, however, that
[a]n isolated instance of mild weaving within a lane is not
sufficiently erratic to justify an investigatory stop.""
3.. Roadblocks
In Crouch v. Commonwealth,0 7 the Virginia Court of Ap-
peals evaluated the constitutionality of a traffic checkpoint.
Specifically, the court considered whether a field officer's control
over the timing of the checkpoint within the officer's "work
week" constituted "unbridled discretion" of that officer so as to
render the checkpoint unconstitutional."°
100. Id. (citations omitted).
101. Id. at 18, 497 S.E.2d at 482.
102. See id.
103. 27 Va. App. 233, 498 S.E.2d 422 (Ct. App. 1998).
104. See id.
105. Id. at 239, 498 S.E.2d at 425.
106. Id.
107. 26 Va. App. 214, 494 S.E.2d 144 (Ct. App. 1997).
108. See id. at 219, 494 S.E.2d at 146.
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The court of appeals noted that the trooper responsible for
the checkpoint had no discretion to decide the location of the
assigned roadblock."° The court further recognized that, al-
though the trooper was allowed to determine when to set up
the checkpoint, the decision had to be pre-approved by a super-
visor not part of the detail before any vehicles could be
stopped."' The court found that the rationale for providing
the troopers a limited amount of discretion was to allow weath-
er conditions to be evaluated and to determine the availability
of other officers to assist."' Consequently, based upon the
facts, the court of appeals held that the traffic checkpoint was
established properly and the trooper's limited, supervised dis-
cretion under explicitly neutral guidelines did not constitute
"unbridled discretion" prohibited by law."
The Virginia Court of Appeals in Gilpin v. Common-
wealth,"' however, held that a legitimate roadblock stop can
become unconstitutional if the officer detains the vehicle"
without justification after the activities called for in the road-
block operational plan have been concluded."' Gilpin's vehicle
was stopped at a roadblock. After concluding the standard
checks called for in the operational plan, the police officer or-
dered Gilpin, who had a valid North Carolina license, to pull
over to the side of the road while he checked Gilpin's license
status. The officer suspected that Gilpin's license might be
suspended in Virginia because the car was registered to his'
girlfriend in Virginia, and, in his experience, North Carolina
often granted licenses to drivers who had their license suspend-
ed in Virginia."'
The court of appeals found that these considerations did not
give rise to a reasonable suspicion that Gilpin was violating the
law, and consequently, the extended detention beyond that nor-
mally required by the roadblock was unreasonable under the
109. See id at 219, 494 S.E.2d at 146-47.
110. See id. at 220, 494 S.E.2d at 147.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 219-20, 494 S.E.2d at 146-47.
113. 26 Va. App. 105, 493 S.E.2d 393 (Ct. App. 1997).
114. See id. at 110, 493 S.E.2d at 395.
115. See id. at 107-08, 493 S.E.2d at 394.
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Fourth Amendment." 6  Accordingly, the court dismissed
Gilpin's convictions for possession of the guns found during the
search of the car and for attempting to escape the officer's cus-
tody during the illegal detention."7
4. Community Caretaker Function
The Virginia Court of Appeals, in Wood v. Common-
wealth,"8 had difficulty agreeing on the application of the po-
lice "community caretaker" function as justification for a war-
rantless intrusion on the defendant's privacy interests associat-
ed with his home. When called to a home on a domestic vio-
lence complaint, police officers arrested the husband-and, the
wife not being present, waited at the home until a social servic-
es representative arrived to awaken and remove their two
young children. Then, maintaining that they were looking for a
teenage son of the couple who had been reported missing, the
officers went into the house and searched upstairs, where they
had seen a light on, and detected a foul odor. In plain view,
they saw drugs and firearms. They left to get a search warrant,
leaving the house unlocked. At the police station, the husband
consented to a further search of the residence. Returning with-
out a warrant, the officers seized the contraband and charged
the husband with its possession."'
A panel of the court of appeals upheld the admission of the
evidence because the police, acting as community caretakers,
acted reasonably when they looked upstairs for the missing
son." ° On rehearing en banc, a five-judge plurality first ex-
pressed doubt that the "community caretaker" rationale could
be applied to justify searches of homes, as opposed to automo-
biles, but held that it could not be applied here .because a legit-
imate "community caretaker" intrusion must be "totally di-
vorced" from any criminal investigation.' Also, the intrusion
here was, in the opinion of the five judges, an extension of the
116. See id. at 112, 493 S.E.2d at 396.
117. See id. at 113, 493 S.E.2d at 397.
118. 27 Va. App. 21, 497 S.E.2d 484 (Ct. App. 1998) (en banc).
119. See id. at 24-25, 497 S.E.2d at 485-86.
120. See Wood v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 654, 484 S.E.2d 627 (Ct. App. 1997).
121. See Wood, 27 Va. App. at 28-30, 497 S.E.2d at 487.
1108
CRIMINAL LAW
criminal investigation rather than a bona fide effort to find the
missing teenager.'
Two other judges opined that the community caretaker doc-
trine could justify warrantless entry of a home but concurred in
the result because the circumstances did not justify such an
intrusion.' Three dissenting judges observed that the court of
appeals had held, in Commonwealth v. Waters,' that the
community caretaker doctrine was not limited to automobile
searches and concluded that the facts of this case justified ap-
plication of the community caretaker doctrine.'
5. Fifth Amendment-Custodial Interrogation
In Lilly v. Commonwealth,' shortly after the defendant's
arrest, he asked a police officer to shoot him.' The officer
asked the defendant if he thought the officer looked like a mur-
derer. Then, in subsequent conversation, the officer asked the
defendant what a murderer looked like. The defendant respond-
ed, "me."' The Supreme Court of Virginia held that this ad-
mission, although unwarned and made while in custody, was
properly admitted in evidence because the defendant had initi-
ated the conversation and the statement was voluntary."
B. Sixth Amendment-Right to Counsel
In Watkins v. Commonwealth,"' the Virginia Court of Ap-
peals found that a felony defendant had knowingly, intelligent-
ly, and voluntarily waived the assistance of counsel and elected
to represent himself. 3' The court made this ruling despite the
absence of a written waiver and the absence of proof that the
defendant understood the nature and consequences of his waiv-
122. See id. at 30, 497 S.E.2d at 487.
123. See id. at 32, 497 S.E.2d at 489.
124. 20 Va. App. 285, 291, 456 S.E.2d 527, 530 (Ct. App. 1995).
125. See Wood, 27 Va. App. at 33-37, 497 S.E.2d at 489-92.
126. 255 va. 558, 499 S.E.2d 522 (1998).
127. See id. at 566, 499 S.E.2d at 529.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 576, 499 S.E.2d at 533.
130. 26 Va. App. 335, 494 S.E.2d 859 (Ct. App. 1998).
131. See id. at 343-46, 494 S.E.2d at 863-65.
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er.12 The court of appeals reached this decision based largely
on the defendant's preparation and argument of several elabo-
rate pro se motions and on his request for appointment of a
standby counsel to advise him during trial."s
C. Sixth Amendment-Speedy Trial
In Baker v. Commonwealth," the Virginia Court of Appeals
affirmed its panel decision. 5 and dismissed this case for lack
of a speedy trial.' Baker was charged and indicted for bur-
glary and related offenses. The circuit court set trial for Baker
and his co-defendants on a date within the five month speedy
trial period.' The Commonwealth then moved for a continu-
ance to add new charges, and Baker and his co-defendants
objected. 8' The trial court overruled the defendants' objection
and 'inquired about possible dates on which to hold trial."'
Baker's counsel suggested a date which was suitable to all
counsel but it was outside the five month period in which the
Commonwealth was required to bring the defendants to trial.
The court was unable to try the case on the date suggested
and, instead, set trial two days sooner than the suggested
date."4 The date, however, was still beyond the five month
period. When the five month period expired, Baker moved to
dismiss, for lack of a speedy trial under the statute.'' The
court took the motion under advisement, and the Common-
wealth sought and obtained an additional continuance to which
Baker did not object. The trial court ultimately overruled
Baker's motion to dismiss holding that Baker had waived his
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. 26 Va. App. 175, 493 S.E.2d 687 (Ct. App. 1997) (en banc).
135. See 25 Va. App. 19, 486 S.E.2d 111 (Ct. App. 1997).
136. See Baker, 26 Va. App. at 176, 493 S.E.2d at 687.
137. See Baker, 25 Va. App. at 21-22, 486 S.E.2d at 112-13; see also VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-248 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 1998).
138. See Baker, 25 Va. App. at 21, 486 S.E.2d at 112.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id.
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statutory speedy trial rights by suggesting a date outside the
five month period.'
The Virginia Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed the
indictments.' The court held that, by suggesting the avail-
able date only after the trial court had overruled his objection
to the Commonwealth's first continuance motion, Baker had not
waived his speedy trial rights or agreed to the continuance.'45
The court of appeals noted that it was incumbent on the Com-
monwealth to bring the defendant to trial within the statutory
period and that the defendant has no duty to demand a trial
within that period.' The court opined that a waiver must be
an intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege47
and that courts must indulge every reasonable presumption
against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.'
D. Sixth Amendment-Confrontation
In James v. Commonwealth,'49 the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia found no violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right of confrontation and cross-examination when the trial
court prohibited counsel from asking an expert witness whether
a Commonwealth's witness was "capable of lying."50 The de-
fendant shot two men, killing one and causing severe brain in-
jury to the other. 5' When the latter recovered, he testified
against the defendant at trial. The Commonwealth also present-
ed the testimony from the medical doctor who had treated the
witness's brain injuries. The doctor explained that the witness
was recovering from "problems with thinking, memory, [and]
judgment."'52 On cross-examination, the defense attempted to
143. See id.
144. See id at 25, 486 S.E.2d at 114.
145. See id. at 23-24, 486 S.E.2d at 113-14.
146. See id. (citing Baity v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 497, 501, 431 S.E.2d 891,
893 (Ct. App. 1993)); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 425, 429-30, 404 S.E.2d
86, 88 (Ct. App. 1991)).
147. See id. at 24-25, 486 S.E.2d at 114 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
464 (1938)).
148. See id. (citing Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937)).
149. 254 Va. 95, 487 S.E.2d 205 (1997).
150. See id. at 98, 487 S.E.2d at 206.
151. See id. at 96, 487 S.E.2d at 206.
152. Id. at 97, 487 S.E.2d at 206.
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ask the doctor whether the witness was "capable of lying to-
day. " 1  The trial court sustained the Commonwealth's objec-
tion and allowed the defense only to ask whether the witness's
injuries affected his ability to distinguish right from wrong or
truth from falsehood."
The supreme court afi ed the decision of the trial
court. 5 The court reiterated the well-established principle
that the Sixth Amendment provides only the opportunity for
cross-examination. 5 ' Questioning must be conducted according
to the rules of evidence, and thus, matters of credibility of wit-
nesses are exclusively for the jury.'
E. Eighth Amendment-Death Penalty
In Buchanan v. Angelone," the Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States considered and rejected what had become a-'routine
complaint of Virginia death row inmates.5 ' The complaint
was that the standard Virginia jury instructions for the penalty
phase of a capital case violated the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments by failing to provide the jury with express guid-
ance on the concept of mitigation and to instruct the jury on
particular statutorily defined mitigating factors."6
Buchanan, convicted of capital murder of multiple people in
the same act or transaction,16 1 presented evidence of his trou-
bled childhood and dysfunctional family life. 62 The trial court
denied Buchanan's request that the judge give jury instructions
on each of the statutorily defined mitigating factors" and or-
der the jury to consider the existence of such factors as mitigat-
ing against the death penalty." The judge also refused to in-
153. Id.
154. See id. at 97, 487 S.E.2d at 207.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. 118 S. Ct. 757 (1998).
159. See id. at 763.
160. See id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(B) (Repl. Vol. 1996).
161. See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(7) (Repl. Vol. 1996).
162. See Buchanan, 118 S. Ct. at 759.
163. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (B) (Repl. Vol. 1996).
164. See Buchanan, 118 S. CL at 759-60.
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struct the jury to consider all the circumstances of the offense
and Buchanan's history and background in reaching their deci-
sion.'" Instead, the trial court instructed the jury that if they
found either vileness or future dangerousness beyond a reason-
able doubt, then they may fix the penalty at death; but, if they
found from all the evidence that the death penalty was not
justified, then they must fix the penalty at life in prison."6
The penalty verdict form also required the jury to state that
they had considered all the evidence before reaching a verdict
of death.16 '
On certiorari from the denial of federal habeas corpus relief
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
the United States Supreme Court held that Buchanan's argu-
ment confused the Eighth Amendment's requirements for the
eligibility phase of a capital case, in which the fact finder deter-
mines if the defendant has committed a crime for which the
death penalty may be imposed, and those of the selection
phase, in which the sentencer actually decides if this defendant
should receive the death penalty." In the eligibility phase,
the fact finder's discretion must be channeled to ensure that
the death penalty is not disproportionate to the crime and is
not arbitrarily or capriciously applied.69 In the selection
phase, by contrast, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment
requires only that the sentencer not be precluded from consider-
ing any constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence and does
not require states to provide affirmative structuring of the way
in which mitigating evidence is considered.' By directing the
jury to base their decision on all the evidence, the Virginia jury
instructions complied with the Eight and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.'
The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld four death sentences
during the period covered in this article. 2 Summarized below
165. See id.
166. See id. at 760. These are standard jury instructions.
167. See id.
168. See id. at 761-67.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See id. at 763.
172. See Walton v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 85, 501 S.E.2d 134 (1998) (murder
during commission of robbery while armed with deadly weapon; sentence based on
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are the cases relating to the law governing capital punish-
ment.
73
In Jackson v. Commonwealth,74 the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia affirmed the death penalty of a defendant who was six-
teen years-old at the time he committed the murder.175 The
murder was accomplished in the course of an attempted armed
robbery of a stranger who was waiting for a companion to pur-
chase crack cocaine. 76 Jackson contended that Virginia law
had not approved capital punishment of minors in accordance
with the United States Supreme Court's requirements as estab-
lished in Stanford v. Kentucky. 7  The supreme court found
that such punishment was permitted under sections 16.1-269.1
and 16.1-272 of the Virginia Code,'78 authorizing adult penal-
ties for properly transferred juveniles over fourteen years of
age.- '79 The court found that the death penalty was not dispro-
portionate for the defendant, who had a substantial previous re-
cord of criminal activity (including violent offenses) and who
shot a stranger in cold blood when his victim would not pro-
duce money in response to his demand." °
Justice Hassell dissented, asserting that the death penalty
was disproportionate for Jackson because all other sixteen-year-
old juveniles convicted of capital murder in Virginia have re-
ceived life sentences.'8 ' The majority, however, held that the
defendant's age was only one factor and that the court should
compare Jackson's case not only with those of other sixteen-
future dangerousness); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 625, 499 S.E.2d 538 (1998)
(murder in course of attempted robbery while armed with deadly weapon; sentence
based on future dangerousness); Lilly v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 558, 499 S.E.2d 522
(1998) (murder in course of robbery while armed with deadly weapon; sentence based
on future dangerousness and vileness); Beck v. Commonwealth, 253 Va. 373, 484
S.E.2d 898 (1997) (murder in course of rape and three murders in course of robbery
while armed with deadly weapon; sentence based on future dangerousness and vile-
ness).
173. Capital cases, involving other noteworthy points of criminal law, are discussed
later in this article.
174. 255 Va. 625, 499 S.E.2d 538 (1998).
175. See id. at 652, 499 S.E.2d at 555.
176. See id. at 632-33, 499 S.E.2d at 542-43.
177. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
178. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-269.1, -272 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 1998).
179. See Jackson, 255 Va. at 647, 499 S.E.2d at 552.
180. See id. at 651-52, 499 S.E.2d at 554-55.
181. See id. at 652-55, 499 S.E.2d at 555-57 (Hassell, J., dissenting).
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year-olds, but with all capital murder convictions.182 Moreover,
the majority held that the court should consider the crime and
the defendant, especially those involving murder in the course
of attempted robbery and the future dangerousness predi-
cate.183
In Lilly v. Commonwealth,' the Supreme Court of Virginia
rejected a claim that the holding of Simmons v. South Caroli-
na 1  required that a capital murder defendant be permitted
to "educate" a jury during voir dire about the defendant's non-
eligibility for parole." The supreme court held that the jury
was instructed properly on this subject, and the defense was
allowed to argue it in the penalty phase closing argument.'
In Walton v. Commonwealth," the trial court, conducting
the penalty phase without a jury after Walton pleaded guilty to
capital murder and related felonies, orally found that the evi-
dence proved both the vileness and the future dangerousness
predicates, but its sentencing order contained only a finding of
future dangerousness.'89 Walton contended on appeal that the
court erred in finding that vileness was proven. The Supreme
Court of Virginia refused to consider the claim, holding that
because "a trial court speaks only through its written orders,"
the death sentence was not predicated on the vileness find-
ing."9 The court refused to consider a nunc pro tunc sentenc-
ing order entered after the defendant had filed his notice of
appeal because the trial court had lost jurisdiction of the case
at that point.'9'
In Beck v. Commonwealth,'92 the Supreme Court of Virginia
upheld the trial judge's receipt and consideration, for sentencing
purposes, of "victim impact" evidence from persons not related
182. See id. at 651-52, 499 S.E.2d at 554-55.
183. See id.
184. 255 Va. 558, 499 S.E.2d 522 (1998).
185. 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
186. See Lilly, 255 Va. at 567, 499 S.E.2d at 529.
187. See id. at 567-70, 499 S.E.2d at 529-31.
188. 256 Va. 85, 501 S.E.2d 134 (1998).
189. See id. at 87, 501 S.E.2d 135.
190. Id. at 94, 501 S.E.2d at 140 (quoting Davis v. Mullins, 252 Va. 141, 148, 486
S.E.2d 90, 94 (1996)).
191. See id.
192. 253 Va. 373, 484 S.E.2d 898 (1997).
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to the deceased victims. 93 Beck contended that such evidence
went beyond that constitutionally permitted under relevant
statutes"s and case law.'95 The supreme court ruled that the
reference in these cases to evidence from the victims' family
members described the nature, not the source, of such evi-
dence.'96 The sources of such evidence are limited only "by the
relevance of such evidence to show the impact of the
defendant's actions."197 The court found nothing in the stat-
utes which prohibited such evidence from persons other than
family members.'98
In addition, the defendant complained that the "victim im-
pact" evidence in his case included "recommendations" that the
death penalty be imposed. The court concluded that the trial
court received these comments only as expressions of the depth
of the witnesses' feelings regarding the impact of these crimes
and that the trial judge was presumed, by his training and
experience, to have separated the permissible "victim impact"
evidence from the potentially prejudicial remarks.' 9
F. Fourteenth Amendment
1. Due Process
The Supreme Court of Virginia, in Walton v. Common-
wealth,2" upheld the constitutionality of section 18.2-259.1 of
the Virginia Code, providing for the automatic suspension of
one's driver's license for six months upon conviction for a drug
offense."0' During an authorized police search of Walton's
home, the police found marijuana, which Walton admitted us-
193. See id. at 381-86, 484 S.E.2d at 903-06.
194. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-11.01, -264.5, -299.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum.
Supp. 1998).
195. See Beck, 253 Va. at 381-82, 484 S.E.2d at 903-04 (citing Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 808 (1991)); Weeks v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 460, 450 S.E.2d 379 (1994),
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 829 (1995).
196. See Beck, 253 Va. at 381, 484 S.E.2d at 904.
197. Id.
198. See id.
199. See id. at 586, 484 S.E.2d at 906.
200. 255 Va. 422, 497 S.E.2d 869 (1998), affg 24 Va. App. 757, 485 S.E.2d 641
(Ct. App. 1997).
201. See id. at 428, 497 S.E.2d at 873.
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ing. The trial court convicted him of possession and suspended
his driver's license for six months, pursuant to the statute.2"
On appeal, Walton claimed that the application of the statute
deprived him of substantive due process of law.' Applying
the presumption of constitutionality, the court held that, be-
cause the statute did not affect a fundamental constitutional
right, it would be upheld if it had a "reasonable relation to a
proper purpose and [was] neither arbitrary nor discriminato-
ry.' The court concluded that the purpose of this statute
was to protect persons using the Commonwealth's highways
and that the legislature "could reasonably assume that a person
who possesses illegal substances would use those substances
and could operate a motor vehicle under the influence of [the]
substances.""5
2. Due Process-Right to Confront Witnesses-Disclosure of
Police Observation Post
In Davis v. Commonwealth,2° the Virginia Court of Appeals
held that the trial court erred when it denied the defendant's
pretrial motion to compel disclosure of the location of a police
observation post. The court recognized that the Commonwealth
enjoys a qualified privilege not to disclose the location of a
police observation post.2 7 The court noted, however, that
when a defendant shows that he or she needs that information
to conduct a defense and there is no other adequate means of
"getting at the same point," the trial court must balance law
enforcement and citizen safety concerns against the defendant's
constitutional right to confront witnesses and to prepare a
defense.'
202. See id. at 424, 497 S.E.2d at 871.
203. See id. at 427-28, 497 S.E.2d at 872-73.
204. Id. at 427-28, 497 S.E.2d at 872 (quoting Duke v. County of Pulaski, 219 Va.
428, 438, 247 S.E.2d 824, 829 (1978)).
205. Id. 428, 497 S.E.2d 873 (quoting Walton, 24 Va. App. at 761, 485 S.E.2d at
643).
206. 25 Va. App. 588, 491 S.E.2d 288 (Ct. App. 1997).
207. See id. at 593, 491 S.E.2d at 290.
208. See id. at 593-94, 491 S.E.2d at 290-91.
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In Davis, the defendant was charged with distribution of
cocaine. The police conducted a surveillance at a specific loca-
tion, and an officer saw the defendant on the sidewalk with
another woman. The officer, who had seen Davis before,
watched her drop a white object into the hand of the other
woman. The object was identified later as crack cocaine. The
court found that based upon evidence from a pretrial evidentia-
ry hearing, defense counsel had demonstrated that there were
obstructions in the area.2" An investigator for the defense tes-
tified that, depending upon where the police officer was secret-
ed, the officer's view may have been obstructed. Photographs of
the aiea showed trees, telephone poles and other objects which
could have obstructed an individual's view. The court also noted
the lack of evidence corroborating the surveillance officer's testi-
mony and the presence of other people in the area during sur-
veillance.21 Furthermore, the purchaser of the cocaine could
not identify the defendant as the seller. Thus, the' court con-
cluded that under these conditions the defendant was entitled
to know the location of the observation post.21'
In addition, the court held that the trial court erred by refus-
ing to allow the defendant to call certain witnesses.21 The
witnesses were two property owners who had allowed the police
to use their property for the observation post. According to the
court, because the police officer was the only witness to the
drug transaction, the defendant's ability to raise the issue of
whether the officer's view was obstructed was critical to her
defense. 13 The defendant independently discovered these prop-
erty owners and defense counsel represented that they were
willing to testify.1 4 Also, defense counsel represented that the
surveillance post was no longer in use.1 ' Given these circum-
stances, the court held that Davis should have been allowed to
present those witnesses to challenge the officers' ability to ob-
serve the events.21
209. See id. at 594, 491 S.E.2d at 291.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. See id. at 595-96, 491 S.E.2d at 291-92.
214. See id. at 594 n.2, 491 S.E.2d at 291 n.2.
215. See id. at 596, 491 S.E.2d at 292.
216. See id.
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HI. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-PROVIDING DNA RATIO
PRIOR TO TRIAL
In Caprio v. Commonwealth,21 the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia reversed in part the defendant's conviction for murder
based upon a violation of section 19.2-270.5 of the Virginia
Code."'8 The defendant, relying upon section 19.2-270.5, ar-
gued that the trial court erred by refusing to continue the case
or, alternatively, by refusing to bar the testimony of an expert
with respect to a particular statistic. 19 Specifically, the defen-
dant challenged an expert witness' testimony of a one in
120,000 statistical probability of a DNA match, claiming that
the statistic was a "report" or "statement" of "the results of a
DNA analysis" conducted by the expert who reviewed and com-
bined results of different tests.2 ' Although the defendant had
been provided with all of the independent tests used by the
expert to determine the ratio, because he was not provided with
the specific ratio in a timely manner, the Commonwealth violat-
ed the statute. Accordingly, the defendant either was entitled to
a continuance or the expert should not have been permitted to
testify with respect to the ratio."
The court found that, based upon the plain meaning of the
statute, the expert's blood frequency extrapolation was included
in the provision of Virginia Code section 19.2-270.5; therefore,
the trial court should have granted the defendant a continuance
217. 254 Va. 507, 493 S.E.2d 371 (1997).
218. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-270.5 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 1998).
At the time of the defendant's trial, section 19.2-270.5, provided in pertinent
part:
Af least twenty-one days prior to commencement of the proceedings in
which the results of a DNA analysis will be offered as evidence, the par-
ty intending to offer the evidence . .. shall provide or make available
copies of the profiles and the report or statement to be introduced. In the
event that such notice is not given, and the person proffers such evi-
dence, then the court may in its discretion either allow the opposing
party a continuance or, under appropriate circumstances, bar the person
from presenting such evidence.
Caprio, 254 Va. at 511, 493 S.E.2d at 373 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-270.5
(Repl. Vol. 1995) (emphasis added)).
219. See id. at 509, 493 S.E.2d at 372.
220. Id. at 512, 493 S.E.2d at 374.
221. See id. at 511, 493 S.E.2d at 373.
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once it determined that the evidence was admissible.' Fur-
ther, because the one in 120,000 probability of individuals with
such a blood profile differed so greatly from the one in 210
probability based upon earlier, more limited test results given
to defense counsel, the court could not say that the error was
harmless.'
IV. SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW
A. Homicide; Involuntary Manslaughter
The Supreme Court of Virginia found the evidence sufficient
tb prove criminal negligence and, thus, involuntary manslaugh-
ter in Greenway v. Commonwealth.' Greenway contended
that the evidence proved only his excessive speed of eighty-five
miles per hour on the interstate highway.' The court, howev-
ei, ruled that Greenway was overlooking the context in which
the evidence showed his offense occurred. He was driving in
heavy Memorial Day weekend traffic on Interstate 95, weaving
through traffic, and repeatedly and abruptly changing lanes
rather than adjusting his speed to that of the surrounding
drivers. It was in that context that he was driving when he hit
another vehicle from behind, killing the driver and her passen-
ger.2" The evidence sufficed to convict Greenway for man-
slaughter based upon his criminal negligence.
B. Forcible Sodomy-Proof of Penetration
In Moore v. Commonwealth,' the Supreme Court of Virgin-
ia reversed the defendant's conviction for the rape of a child
under the age of thirteen. In Moore, due to the nature of the
child's testimony and the lack of medical or forensic evidence,
the Commonwealth failed to prove the essential element of
penetration. During the Commonwealth's case-in-chief, the vic-
222. See id. at 511-12, 493 S.E.2d 374.
223. See id.
224. 254 Va. 147, 487 S.E.2d 224 (1997).
225. See id. at 151, 491 S.E.2d at 226.
226. See id.
227. 254 Va. 184, 491 S.E.2d 739 (1997).
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tim testified that the defendant placed his penis "in" and "on"
her vagina.' The court characterized this evidence as "in a
state of equipoise" on the essential element of penetration.'
The court noted that Moore was not a case where inconsisten-
cies developed during cross-examination of the victim or where
other evidence contradicted the testimony of the victim.' ° In-
stead, this case involved two different accounts of essential
facts that were all provided by the victim during direct exami-
nation. Consequently, a portion of the Commonwealth's own
evidence was consistent with innocence. 1
The court noted that the prosecutor incorrectly believed that
proof of the defendant's penis "on" the victim's vagina was suffi-
cient to prove penetration. 2 While recognizing that "penetra-
tion of any portion of the vulva" is sufficient to prove penetra-
tion, the court found that when the child referred to her "va-
gina," she clearly was "describing the external part of that
portion of her anatomy."' Thus, the victim's testimony
standing alone, as a matter of law, failed to prove penetration.
In Horton v. Commonwealth,' the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia affirmed the conviction of two defendants, Horton and
Newby, of forcible sodomy by engaging in cunnilingus. The
court found that the Commonwealth had proven that the re-
spective defendants penetrated the outer portion of their
victim's gnitalia.' In Horton's situation, the twelve-year-old
victim awoke to find Horton standing at the door of her bed-
room. Describing the defendant's actions, the victim stated that
after Horton licked her breasts and attempted to "get his penis
in [her] vagina," he then licked her vagina with his tongue. 6
In Newby's situation, the victim testified that Newby first
"put his penis in [her] vagina," but because her vagina area
228. See id. at 187-88, 491 S.E.2d at 740-41.
229. Id. at 189, 491 S.E.2d at 741.
230. See id. at 189-90, 491 S.E.2d at 742.
231. See id.
232. See id.
233. Id. at 190, 491 S.E.2d at 792.
234. 255 Va. 606, 499 S.E.2d 258 (1998).
235. See id. at 608, 499 S.E.2d at 258.
236. Id. at 609, 494 S.E.2d at 259.
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was dry and unlubricated, he pulled his penis out. 7 Next,
Newby "put his mouth on [her] vaginal area and he
drooled .... .2"8 When asked if the defendant's mouth was
specifically on her vaginal area, the victim replied that "he was
'on my vulva area."" 9 She also testified that Newby put his
mouth on her genitalia at least twice and put his penis back
into her vagina. He eventually ejaculated inside her. The defen-
dant testified at trial and claimed that the victim consented to
the sexual activity. Newby testified that he "did lick Mrs. [C's]
vaginal area" and "did penetrate her with [his] penis," but that
the victim never resisted. 4
The supreme court discussed the nature of cunnilingus, which
is the act of "stimulation of the vulva or clitoris with the lips or
tongue.""' The court also recognized the anatomy of the fe-
male genitalia in relation to the act of cunnilingus and found
that "penetration of any portion of the vulva is sufficient to
prove sodomy by cunnilingus," and that "[p]enetration of the
vaginal opening or vagina is not required." 2
The court held in Horton's case, that the victim's testimony
that the defendant licked her vagina demonstrated penetration
of her vulva or outermost portion of her genitalia; therefore, the
Commonwealth proved sodomy by cunnilingus.' The court
reached the same conclusion in Newby's case. According to the
court, "[t]he jury could have inferred from [the] evidence that
Newby licked [the victim's] vagina or vaginal opening" in order
to lubricate her because he then re-inserted his penis into the
victim's vagina.244 All the evidence presented by the Common-
wealth tended to prove that the defendant penetrated the
victim's outermost genitalia and committed forcible sodomy by
cunnilingus.
237. Id. at 611, 494 S.E.2d at 260.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 612, 499 S.E.2d at 261.
242. Id. at 613, 499 S.E.2d at 261-62.
243. See id. at 614, 499 S.E.2d at 262.
244. Id.
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C. Grand Larceny-Proof of Value
In Parker v. Commonwealth,' the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia reversed the defendant's conviction for grand larceny and
remanded the case for a new trial on the charge of petit larce-
ny. The court found that the Commonwealth failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the value of the stolen item
was $200 or more.' The defendant stole the handset of a
cordless telephone but left the base of the telephone behind.
The owner of the telephone testified that she valued the "cord-
less telephone unit" at more than $200. The receipt showed
that the owner paid $239.99 for the entire telephone unit four
months prior to its theft." The court found that because
there was no evidence that the handset was worth $200 or
more, the Commonwealth failed to prove that the value of the
handset met the required statutory amount for grand larce-
ny.' The court rejected the trial court's specific finding that
the base of the cordless telephone unit had no functional value
without the handset." In addition, the court rejected the
Commonwealth's theory that the value of a stolen component of
a unit is the same as the value of the entire unit when the
theft renders the whole unit inoperable.o
D. Single Larceny Rule
In Richardson v. Commonwealth, 1 the Virginia Court of
Appeals dealt with the construction and applicability of the
"single larceny doctrine." The trial court convicted the defen-
dant of two counts of grand larceny and two counts of felonious
petit larceny for thefts which occurred in various locations with-
in a hospital complex. The defendant claimed that the thefts
constituted a single act of larceny rather than four separate lar-
245. 254 Va. 118, 489 S.E.2d 482 (1997).
246. See id. at 121, 489 S.E.2d at 483-84.
247. See id. at 119, 489 S.E.2d at 483.
248. See id. at 120, 489 S.E.2d at 483; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-95 (Repl.
1996 & Cum. Supp. 1998).
249. See id. at 121, 489 S.E.2d at 484.
250. See id.
251. 25 Va. App. 491, 489 S.E.2d 697 (Ct. App. 1997) (en banc).
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cenies. The court of appeals affirmed the defendant's conviction
on three of the larcenies and reversed one. 2
The critical question involved the theft of two purses which
occurred at or about the same time and from the same nurses'
station. The court noted the difficulty related to applying the
"single larceny doctrine."' The court explained, however, that
"[t]he overriding principle behind the single larceny doctrine is
to prevent the state from aggregating multiple criminal penal-
ties for a single criminal act."2u To determine whether multi-
ple thefts which occur at the same location constitute only one
larceny, the critical question is whether the thefts "were part of
the same larcenous impulse or scheme and were part of a con-
tinuous act constituting a single larceny." 5 If so, the single
larceny rule applies and the thefts constitute a single larce-
ny.
6
The court agreed with the ,trial court concerning the
defendant's theft of items from several floors or separate build-
ings within the hospital complexY7 Although accomplished
pursuant to the defendant's "general scheme to steal," the
thefts were separate and distinct. 8 The court held that each
theft "was a separate and discrete offense and was not part of
the same impulse or continuous larcenous act at the same loca-
tion." 59
The court, however, reversed the trial court with regard to
the two thefts of purses from the same nurses' station. Address-
ing those thefts, the court found that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to prove that the defendant "formed separate and distinct
intentions to steal or to commit two separate thefts even
though the purses were separated by approximately ten
feet."21 Consequently, the court found only one larceny under
the single larceny doctrine because the thefts occurred at ap-
252. See id. at 493-95, 489 S.E.2d at 698-99.
253. See id. at 496-97, 489 S.E.2d at 700.
254. Id. at 496, 489 S.E.2d at 700.
255. Id. at 497, 489 S.E.2d at 700.
256. See id. at 495-98, 489 S.E.2d at 700.
257. See id. at 498, 484 S.E.2d at 701.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
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proximately the same time, from the same room or location,
and pursuant to one impulse or design to steal items from the
nurses' station."6
In Sagastume v. Commonwealth,262 the Virginia Court of
Appeals refused to apply the "single larceny rule" to a case
where the defendant raped a woman, stole personal property
from her home, and then attempted to flee in her car. The de-
fendant originally was charged, in addition to other offenses,
with three counts of grand larceny for the theft of personal
property belonging to the victim and her husband, the theft of
firearms belonging to them, and the theft of the victim's
Volvo.' The trial court granted the defendant's motion to
strike larceny of the firearms because it was indistinguishable
from the other personal property stolen, but the court allowed a
change for the independent larceny of the Volvo to stand.'
The court of appeals found that the trial court correctly al-
lowed two separate charges of larceny to go to the jury. The
court noted that the record demonstrated that the defendant
took various items of personal property from the house and
that "the purpose of the thefts was to sell the items, or possibly
in the case of the rifles, to use them for protection."2 5 The
court recognized that "[t]he jury could also have inferred that
the larceny of the Volvo occurred at a later time, outside the
home, and [that] the intent evinced by this theft was to steal
the car to transport appellant away from the scene of his
crimes."' Thus, the court determined that the jury could
reasonably have concluded that regardless of any "general
scheme" the two larceny offenses were independent and "not
part of the same impulse or continuous larcenous act at the
same location." 7  Accordingly, the court affirmed the
defendant's convictions.2"
261. See id. at 498-99, 489 S.E.2d at 701.
262. 27 Va. App. 466, 499 S.E.2d 586 (Ct. App. 1998).
263. See id. at 469, 499 S.E.2d at 588.
264. See id. at 470, 499 S.E.2d at 588.
265. Id. at 472, 499 S.E.2d at 589.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. See id.
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E. Burglary
The Supreme Court of Virginia in Tyler v. Common-
wealth,269 found that fingerprint evidence alone was sufficient
to support a conviction for statutory burglary and grand lar-
ceny. A burglar broke into a store by shattering a plate glass
window. Police found shards of glass all over the sidewalk just
below the window. Six pieces of broken glass found at the base
of the broken window contained the defendant's latent finger-
prints. Police found some of the pieces leaning against the in-
side and some against the outside of the building. Additionally,
the police discovered the defendant's prints on both sides of five
of the glass pieces. Although the defendant had never worked
for the store, he contended that the evidence did not eliminate
the possibility that he may have come along the sidewalk and
innocently picked up these pieces of glass, leaning them where
they were found in order to avoid stepping on them.270
Comparing this case with Avent v. Commonwealth27' and
applying the familiar principle that circumstantial evidence
must only eliminate those reasonable hypotheses of innocence
which flow from the evidence itself,272 the court found it un-
reasonable to infer that the defendant would have tampered
with six pieces of glass by leaning them both outside and inside
the window while leaving the remaining pieces scattered on the
sidewalk. 3 Instead, the court found that the only reasonable
inference was that the defendant had broken the window and
pulled the fragments out to avoid cuts as he entered the
store. 74
269. 254 Va. 162, 487 S.E.2d 221 (1997).
270. See id. at 163-64, 487 S.E.2d 222.
271. 209 Va. 474, 164 S.E.2d 655 (1968).
272. See Turner v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 141, 146-47, 235 S.E.2d 357, 361
(1977).
273. See Tyler, 254 Va. at 167, 487 S.E.2d at 224.
274. See id.
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F. Perjury
In Waldrop v. Commonwealth,275 the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia reversed a perjury conviction for failing to report cash
donations on a campaign finance disclosure form. Not only did
the court find that the donations in question were not required
to be reported under the law, but it also relied on the principle
that perjury requires that the defendant know that the state-
ment was false when made.276 This defendant lacked the req-
uisite knowledge when he acted on advice of counsel, who inter-
preted an unclear statute to provide that the donations in ques-
tion did not have to be reported on the form.277
I
G. Driving Under the Influence
A panel of the Virginia Court of Appeals in Leake v. Com-
monwealth,27 shed important new light on the circumstances
under which one may be deemed to be operating a motor vehi-
cle and, thus, convicted of driving or operating the vehicle while
under the influence of intoxicants. Leake was found standing
beside his truck on the passenger side with the door open and
in the process of sliding a large knife under the floorboard mat
on the passenger side. The key was in the ignition and the mo-
tor was running, the headlights and taillights were illuminated,
and no one elqe was present. Leake told the officer he had "just
left his house to ride around the block and was going straight
back home."279
The court analyzed several earlier Supreme Court of Virginia
decisions delineating the operation of a motor vehicle and con-
cluded that, because Leake had remained with his truck after
he started the engine and because no one else -was present, he
had clearly operated the vehicle within the intendment -of the
law.2 0
275. 255 Va. 210, 495 S.E.2d 822 (1998).
276. See id. at 215, 495 S.E.2d at 825.
277. See id. at 214-15, 495 S.E.2d at 825.
278. 27 Va. App. 101, 497 S.E.2d 522 (Ct. App. 1998).
279. Id. at 104, 497 S.E.2d at 524.
280. See id. at 108, 499 S.E.2d at 525-26.
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H. Possession of Contraband with the Intent to Distribute
In White v. Commonwealth,"' the Virginia Court of Appeals
held that the evidence was sufficient to prove that White pos-
sessed cocaine with the intent to distribute. A police officer
testified that he saw the defendant drop a "large white object,"
which had been clenched in his hand, after the group dispersed
upon being warned of the arrival of the police." 2 The officer,
who had been about twenty-five feet away, went over to where
he saw the object fall and found cocaine.'
The court, recognizing that the credibility of the witnesses
was for the trial court to determine as trier of fact, found that
the evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that White
possessed the cocaine.' The officer's testimony and the
defendant's statements proved possession. 5 The court also
found that the evidence proved that White possessed'the con-
traband with the intent to distribute."6 Despite the fact that
White possessed a relatively small amount of cocaine, he had a
pager and $581 on his person. The police also found an "elec-
tronic scale" and shavings of cocaine inside White's vehicle. The
court found that the defendant's possession of cocaine, a large
sum of money, and drug paraphernalia supported the conclusion
that he possessed the cocaine with the intent to distribute."7
V. DEFENSES-INTOXICATION
In Downing v. Commonwealth,' the Virginia Court of Ap-
peals rejected an attempt to meld intoxication with evidence of
a neurological condition to present an insanity defense. In this
case, Downing stabbed his sister-in-law to death after a drink-
ing spreeY Charged with murder, he called a court-appointed
281. 25 Va. App. 662, 492 S.E.2d 451 (Ct. App. 1997) (en banc).
282. See id. at 664, 492 S.E.2d at 452.
283. See id.
284. See id. at 667, 492 S.E.2d at 454.
285. See id.
286. See id. 668, 492 S.E.2d at 454.
287. See id.
288. 26 Va. App. 717, 496 S.E.2d 164 (Ct. App. 1998).
289. See id. at 719-20, 496 S.E.2d at 165.
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defense psychiatrist to testify that he suffered from "pathologi-
cal intoxication," a condition which allegedly results in an un-
characteristic and pathologically violent reaction to intoxication
and which, according to the defense expert, is often neurologi-
cally basedY Downing sought appointment of a neurologist
as well, but because the psychologist testified that a neurologi-
cal evaluation was not necessary to his diagnosis, the trial
court ruled that appointment of a neurologist was not necessary
for a fair trial. 1 The Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court decision, holding that under the test of Ake v.
Oklahoma, 2 Britt v. North Carolina," and Husske v. Com-
monwealth, 4 the trial court's denial of the motion for ap-
pointment of the additional expert did not prejudice the defen-
dant2
9
At trial, Downing presented the psychologist's testimony in
support of a proffered insanity defense, and the Commonwealth
presented the testimony of another expert that there was no
general consensus in the medical community that pathological
intoxication was a recognized diagnosis.26 At the close of the
evidence, the trial court ruled that Downing's condition could
not, as a matter of law, form the basis of an insanity defense,
and struck the evidence of his condition. ' Finding that he
was not so intoxicated that he could not premeditate the crime,
the trial court convicted him of first degree murder. 8
Downing appealed the trial court's decision to strike the
evidence of his condition in support of his insanity defense and
to refuse to appoint the neurologist. He contended that the
court of appeals should recognize pathological intoxication as a
second exception2  to the general rule that voluntary intoxica-
tion is not an excuse for any crime.3" The court of appeals
290. See id. at 720, 496 S.E.2d at 165.
291. See id. at 721, 496 S.E.2d at 165-66.
292. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
293. 404 U.S. 226 (1971).
294. 252 Va. 203, 476 S.E.2d 920 (1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1092 (1997).
295. See Downing, 26 Va. App. at 723-24, 496 S.E.2d at 167.
296. See id. at 720-21, 496 S.E.2d at 166.
297. See id. at 721, 496 S.E.2d at 166.
298. See id.
299. The first exception is that voluntary intoxication can negate the deliberation
and premeditation required for first degree murder.
300. See Downing, 26 Va. App. at 721, 496 S.E.2d at 166 (citing Wright v. Con-
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rejected this argument, finding that the court was bound by the
rule that voluntary intoxication, even if it produces a state of
temporary insanity, cannot constitute an insanity defense.0 1
VI. EVIDENCE
A. Confessions
In Jackson v. Commonwealth,0 2 the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia clarified the requirement of corroboration for a confession
and showed the rather minimal level of corroboration necessary
for a defendant's confession to attempted robbery. Jackson con-
fessed to demanding money from his victim, and then killing
the victim when he did not produce any. Jackson climbed into
his victim's truck while the victim waited as his passenger
attempted to buy crack cocaine nearby. Jackson contended that
there was no corroboration for his admission that he had de-
manded money from his victim before shooting him. 3 The su-
preme court found sufficient corroboration in (i) the passenger's
testimony that he had left the victim in the truck while he
went to buy drugs, (ii) the testimony of neighbors that they saw
the passenger leave and the defendant get into the vehicle, talk
to the driver, and then shoot him, (iii) the fact that an
accomplice's palm print was found outside the driver's door, and
(iv) the fact that the keys were gone from the ignition."° The
facts were consistent with Jackson's statement that the accom-
plice stood outside the car and had reached in and taken the
keys to prevent the driver from leaving.0 5 To uphold a confes-
sion, the court held that corroboration only needs to be more
consistent with the commission of the offense than with its non-
monwealth, 234 Va. 627, 629, 363 S.E.2d 711, 712 (1988) (citing Boswell v. Common-
wealth, 61 Va. (Gratt.) 860, 870 (1871))).
301. See id. at 722, 496 S.E.2d at 166-67 (citing Jordon v. Commonwealth, 181 Va.
490, 494, 25 S.E.2d 249, 250 (1943) (citing Johnson v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 524,
115 S.E. 673 (1923))).
302. 255 Va. 625, 499 S.E.2d 538 (1998).
303. See id at 645-46, 499 S.E.2d at 551.
304. See id. at 646, 499 S.E.2d at 551.
305. See id.
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commission.80 According to the court, the evidence in this
case met that standard.0
B. Hearsay-Excited Utterances
In Braxton v. Commonwealth,308 the Virginia Court of Ap-
peals relied on the excited utterances exception to the hearsay
rule to uphold the admission of a hearsay statement of a one-
year-old child's description of how a man had hit the child's
mother on the head leading to her death. The child had been
found sleeping over his mother's body in a dazed state. The
statement in question was made sometime later to an adult
who was watching the child. Evidence indicated that the child
had been quiet during the interim since he had been found.
Although it was not clear how much time had elapsed between
his mother's murder and when he was found, an additional
interval of time had elapsed before he made the statement."9
The court of appeals held that the admission of an excited
utterance is not determined solely by the length of time
elapsed. In this 'case, the child's young age, which indicated a
lack of ability to fabricate the account, his condition, and the
circumstances surrounding the statement all indicated that it
was a spontaneous response to a startling event. 10
C. Expert Opinions and Other Evidentiary Rulings
Allowing an expert to testify to hearsay from a complaining
witness and to offer an opinion on the ultimate issue violated a
defendant's due process rights, which required reversal of his
conviction in Jenkins v. Commonwealth."' Jenkins had been
convicted of aggravated sexual battery of a boy under the age of
thirteen. The child had not testified at trial, but the Comon-
wealth introduced the defendant's confession to one instance of
aggravated sexual battery of the boy and the expert testimony
306. See id.
307. See id.
308. 26 Va. App. 176, 493 S.E.2d 688 (Ct. App. 1997).
309. See id. at 181-82, 493 S.E.2d at 690-91.
310. See id. at 184-85, 493 S.E.2d 692.
311. 254 Va. 333, 492 S.E.2d 131 (1997).
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of a clinical psychologist who had examined the child. The doc-
tor testified that the child told him he had been "sexed;" thus,
the doctor opined that the child suffered from a stress-induced
adjustment disorder."2 When asked his opinion what had
caused the stress, the doctor stated that the child "had been
sexually abused."
13
The Supreme Court of Virginia found that the psychologist's
opinion invaded the province of the jury and that the doctor's
repetition of what the child had told him was hearsay, which
did not fall under any exceptions to the hearsay rule."'
Finding the error to be of constitutional dimension, the court
applied the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for harmless
error." 5 The defendant's confession proved one instance of ag-
gravated sexual battery; thus, the erroneous evidence may have
been harmless for purposes of the conviction." 6 Yet, the court
found that it may have led the jury to believe, as the prosecu-
tor had argued, that the abuse had occurred on more than one
occasion. Therefore, the error could not be regarded as harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt for sentencing purposes."7
In Zelenak v. Commonwealth,"8 the Virginia Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the defendant's convictions for attempted rob-
bery, conspiracy to commit robbery, and a related firearms
charge. The court found that the trial court did not err on two
evidentiary rulings."9
A manager of a pizza restaurant was making a night deposit
at a bank when he was approached by a man with a gun and
told to stop. Instead, the manager jumped into his car and
telephoned the police from his cellular telephone. A vehicle
entered the bank parking lot, drove to the back of the bank
where the gunman ran and then sped off. The police stopped
312. See id. at 335-39, 492 S.E.2d at 132-34.
313. Id. at 336, 492 S.E.2d at 133.
314. See id. at 336, 339, 492 S.E.2d at 132, 134-35 (citing Cartera v. Common-
wealth, 219 Va. 516, 248 S.E.2d 784 (1978)).
315. See id. at 336, 482 S.E.2d at 134 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18
(1967)).
316. See id. at 338, 492 S.E.2d at 134.
317. See id.
318. 25 Va. App. 295, 487 S.E.2d 873 (Ct. App. 1997) (en banc).
319. See id. at 297, 487 S.E.2d at 874.
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the vehicle that had retrieved the gunman. The defendant was
the driver of that vehicle. The gunman and another man were
the passengers. 2"
Prior to the defendant's trial, her attorney filed a notice of
intent to present an insanity defense. The trial court, on motion
of the defendant, ordered that she be evaluated to determine
her competency to stand trial. The defendant later withdrew
her notice of intent to present an insanity defense. Thereafter,
the Commonwealth filed a motion in limine to preclude the
expert testimony of a clinical social worker. The Commonwealth
argued that the testimony would be offered as proof of an ulti-
mate issue of fact because it related to the defendant's state of
mind at the time of the offense. The court deferred ruling until
trial.321
Zelenak's defense at trial was that she participated in the
crimes because she was afraid of the passenger and the gun-
man in the car. Defense counsel proffered that the clinical
social worker would testify that the defendant was in great fear
of the man and was afraid that if she did not do as he said,
she would be harmed. The expert would opine that "[the defen-
dant] got to the point where she believed escape from [the man]
or disobedience would result in her death or the death of a
member of her family."3 ' The trial court granted the
Commonwealth's motion to exclude the testimony of this
witness.3"
The court of appeals found that the trial court's ruling was
correct because the proffered testimony amounted to an opinion
on "the precise and ultimate issue in the case. " M Experts
may express an opinion about matters not within common
knowledge, but they may not invade the province of the jury by
expressing an opinion upon an "ultimate issue of fact."3'
Zelenak's defense was duress. In order to prove duress, she was
required to show that her actions were the direct product of
320. See id. at 297-98, 487 S.E.2d at 874.
321. See id. at 298, 487 S.E.2d at 874.
322. Id. at 299, 487 S.E.2d at 875.
323. See id. at 298-99, 487 S.E.2d at 874-75.
324. Id. at 300, 487 S.E.2d at 875.
325. Id.
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threats that caused a reasonable fear of death or serious injury.
Thus, whether Zelenak acted because she was under duress
was the ultimate issue in the case and precisely the testimony
an expert witness is precluded from offering. 6
Prior to Zelenak's testimony at trial, her counsel moved to
prohibit the prosecutor from cross-examining her about state-
ments that she made during her competency evaluation. The
prosecutor argued that cross-examination about the statements
would only be for impeachment. The record does not contain
the trial court's ruling on the motion because the court reporter
was changing tapes. 27
After Zelenak testified on her own behalf, the Commonwealth
called her as a rebuttal witness. The prosecutor asked her if
there was "[slome reason" why she did not like her family or
why she would not "care whether anything happened to
them." The defendant said that she loved her family very
much. The Commonwealth, over defense counsel's objection,
then asked if she told the psychologists that certain members of
her family had "physically and sexually abused her."3 9 The
defendant claimed on appeal that the trial court erred by allow-
ing the prosecutor to ask that question, suggesting that it vio-
lated Virginia Code section 19.2-169.7.33' This statute prohib-
its the use of statements made during a competency evaluation
by the defendant against the defendant except as it relates to
the question of his or her mental condition at the time of the
offense."'
The court of appeals found that the trial court did not err by
permitting the question. Section 19.2-169.7 of the Virginia Code
specifically relates to statements made by the defendant about
the alleged offense or the offense charged. The defendant ar-
gued that, although the statement she attempted to preclude
did not directly relate to the offense, it should be prohibited
because it was irrelevant and highly prejudicial. The court
326. See id.
327. See id. at 301, 487 S.E.2d at 876.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.7 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 1998).
331. See Zelenak, 25 Va. App. at 301, 487 S.E.2d at 876.
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ruled that in light of the defendant's concession with regard to
the nature of the questions and statement and in the absence
of a record of the trial court's ruling, the ruling is presumed
correct. 2 The court of appeals refused to reverse the trial
court's decision to allow the question and response."
D. Lay Opinions
The Supreme Court of Virginia found the admission of a
child's opinion regarding the defendant's driving speed to be
harmless error in Greenway v. Commonwealth.' The twelve-
year-old boy, who testified he had been riding as a passenger in
cars all his life, had witnessed the defendant speed along Inter-
state 95 shortly before striking a vehicle from the rear and
killing the driver and passenger of that vehicle. When asked if
he had an opinion of how fast the vehicle had been moving, the
boy first said he did not, then ventured an estimate of ninety
miles per hour. The supreme court reiterated its prior rulings
that any lay person, even one not licensed to drive, is compe-
tent to estimate the speed of a moving vehicle if they had: an
adequate opportunity to observe the vehicle in motion,' and
if they have a "knowledge of time and distance.""'6 Further-
more, the court held that children are competent witnesses so
long as they demonstrate the requisite abilities to observe,
recollect, and communicate events intelligently and truthful-
ly." The court's ruling, thus, was not predicated on a deci-
sion that an unlicensed twelve-year-old would not, as a matter
of law, be deemed competent to estimate speed, but rather, that
the evidence in this case did not demonstrate that this child
had any "knowledge of time and distance."' Moreover, the
court asserted that his statement as to whether he had ade-
332. See id.
333. See id. at 301-02, 487 S.E.2d at 876.
334. 254 Va. 147, 154, 487 S.E.2d 224, 228 (1997).
335. See Moore v. Lewis, 210 Va. 522, 525, 111 S.E.2d 788, 790 (1960).
336. Greenway, 254 Va. at 152, 487 S.E.2d at 227.
337. See Cross v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 62, 64, 77 S.E.2d 447, 449 (1953).
338. Greenway, 254 Va. at 152, 487 S.E.2d at 227.
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quate opportunity to observe the defendant's car in motion was
equivocal at best."9
The error was harmless, however, because the child's mother
also testified that the defendant was traveling at least eighty-
five miles per hour.' No other evidence of recklessness exist-
ed; therefore, the child's testimony was cumulative."
E. Other Crimes Evidence
In Guill v. Commonwealth,42 the Supreme Court of Virginia
held that evidence of previous crimes was improperly admitted
to prove the defendant's intent to commit rape during a bur-
glary. The defendant broke into a family's home and was
caught backing out of the bedroom of two teenage girls. He had
broken in through a window from which a pocketbook and mon-
ey were visible, and his statement to the police indicated he
had broken in for the purpose of stealing. The trial court ad-
mitted evidence that, years before, he broke into another home
and tried to rape one of the occupants. The Supreme Court of
Virginia reversed both the trial court and the court of appeals,
holding that a prior crime can be used to show intent only
when it is causally related to, logically connected with, or part
of the same transaction as the offense on trial.' No such
connection was present in this case. Even assuming, without
deciding, that prior crimes showing a modus operandi could be
admitted to prove intent rather than identity, the court found
that the crimes in this case were insufficiently idiosyncratic to
be admissible.3 A dissent by Chief Justice Carrico and Jus-
tice Compton disagreed on both points.3"
In Bullock v. Commonwealth,' the Virginia Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the defendant's convictions of malicious wound-
ing, robbery, and two counts of use of a firearm during the
339. See id.
340. See id. at 154, 487 S.E.2d at 228.
341. See id.
342. 255 Va. 134, 495 S.E.2d 489 (1998).
343. See id. at 141, 495 S.E.2d at 493.
344. See id. at 141-42, 495 S.E.2d at 493.
345. See id. at 142-46, 495 S.E.2d at 493-96.
346. 27 Va. App. 255, 498 S.E.2d 433 (Ct. App. 1998).
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commission of a felony. The court rejected the defendant's claim
that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of his "subse-
quent bad acts."' 7
The victim was a man who had just gotten out of his car at
his apartment complex. He was shot at close range with a
weapon that the police concluded was not a handgun. The vic-
tim saw his assailant's face. The victim gave the police a de-
scription of his assailant and later picked him out of a photo
lineup.'
The defendant objected to evidence introduced from two wit-
ifesses at trial. One of the witnesses, Stanley Hawkins, identi-
fied a sawed-off shotgun as the weapon he had borrowed from
-the defendant and had used in a robbery in that jurisdiction
about one month after the victim was shot. He Ladded that,
approximately one week after he borrowed the gun, he pur-
chased the gun from the defendant for twenty-five dollars. The
same night he purchased the gun, Hawkins threw it out of the
car while being pursued by the police. At that time, the defen-
dant was also in the car with Hawkins. 9
The second witness, a police detective, testified that after an
undercover surveillance operation which led to the pursuit dis-
cussed by Hawkins, the police recovered the shotgun thrown
from the car. The victim identified the defendant as his assail-
ant and the recovered shotgun as the weapon used by his as-
sailant. The defense presented four alibi witnesses in an effort
to convince the jury that the defendant was elsewhere at.the
time of the offenses."
The court of appeals found that the trial court correctly al-
lowed Hawkins' and the police detective's testimony about the
shotgun into evidence.3 5' The court determined that the .testi-
mony linked the defendant to the shotgun that was introduced
into evidence as the weapon used in the charged offenses. 2
This evidence tended to prove the identity of the defendant as
347. Id. at 255, 498 S.E.2d at 433-34.
348. See id. at 258-59, 498 S.E.2d at 434.
349. See idt at 259, 498 S.E.2d at 435.
350. See id. at 262, 498 S.E.2d at 436.
351. See idi at 260-63, 498 SXE.2d at 435-37.
352. See id. at 262, 498 S.E.2d at 436.
1998] 1137
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1091
the criminal agent in the robbery and malicious wounding
counts.3  The court went on to state, "[i]n addition,
appellant's possession of the shotgun was an element of the two
counts of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. Conse-
quently, the disputed evidence was sufficiently related to the
crimes charged and satisfied [the] threshold requirement [that
it have probative value]."354
In addition, the court determined that the second part of the
test concerning admissibility of evidence of "other crimes" or
"other bad acts" was met because the probative value out-
weighed any incidental prejudicial effect.355 The court noted
that the defendant presented an alibi defense and that the
Comffionwealth bore the burden to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant was the person who committed the
crimes. 56 The challenged evidence tended to establish the
defendant's ownership of the weapon used in the shooting,
which 'was critical in linking the defendant to the crimes and in
corroborating the victim's identification of the defendant as his
assailant.57 The incidental prejudice associated with the evi-
dence reflecting that the defendant was "involved with ques-
tionable associates in questionable circumstances" was out-
weighed by the substantial probative value of the evidence."s
F. Exculpatory Evidence
In Soering v. Deeds,59 the Supreme Court of Virginia ap-
plied familiar principles to find that a habeas corpus petitioner,
imprisoned for two murders, had not been deprived of due pro-
cess of law by the withholding of exculpatory evidence.3" In-
formation known by the police but not disclosed to the defense,
about the brief detention and questioning of two drifters was
found not to be material exculpatory evidence. The two drifters
later committed an unrelated murder in a neighboring jurisdic-
353. See id. at 261-62, 498 S.E.2d at 435-36.
354. Id. at 261-62, 498 S.E.2d at 436.
355. See id. at 262-64, 498 S.E.2d at 435-37.
356. See id. at 262, 498 S.E.2d at 436.
357. See id.
358. Id. at 263, 498 S.E.2d at 436.
359. 255 Va. 457, 499 S.E.2d 514 (1998).
360. See id. at 464, 499 S.E.2d at 518.
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tion after being stopped and questioned by the police while
hitchhiking on a highway in the county where the murders in
question had occurred. Because there was no connection be-
tween the drifters and the murders for which petitioner was
convicted and because any suspicion of them would require the
jury to ignore overwhelming evidence of the petitioner's guilt,
there was no reasonable probability that disclosure would have
led to a different outcome in petitioner's trial.36'
VII. TRIALS
A. Jurisdiction Venue
In Foster-Zahid v. Commonwealth,"2 the Supreme Court of
Virginia affirmed the defendant's conviction of custodial inter-
ference (felony parental abduction) for the reasons stated in the
opinion of the Virginia Court of Appeals.3" The issues were
whether the Fairfax County Circuit Court had jurisdiction to
try the defendant for abduction and whether Fairfax, Virginia,
was the appropriate venue."' Consistent with the custody
agreement and court order, the child's father took him from
Fairfax, Virginia, to Wisconsin for his fall visit with his mother.
The court order required the mother to return the child to his
father in Fairfax two days later. The defendant failed to return
the child to his father as required by the court order. The fa-
ther obtained a Wisconsin court order enforcing the Virginia
decree, but the defendant absconded with the child to California
and then Colorado. She was apprehended in Colorado for the
abduction of the child and tried in Fairfax County, Vfrginia.3"
Felony parental abduction applies to any person who with-
holds a child outside of Virginia from the child's custodial par-
ent in violation of a Virginia court order if the custodial parent
resides in Virginia." The court of appeals found that the
361. See id.
362. 254 Va. 168, 489 S.E.2d 687 (1997).
363. See Foster-Zahid v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 430, 477 S.E.2d 759 (Ct.
App. 1996).
364. See Foster-Zahid, 254 Va. at 168, 489 S.E.2d at 687.
365. See Foster-Zahid, 23 Va. App. at 434-35, 477 S.E.2d at 761.
366. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-79.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 1998).
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statutory language demonstrates the legislature's intent "to
make criminal an act occurring outside of Virginia that causes
harm within."67 The "gravamen of the offense is the withhold-
ing of the child from the custodial parent outside the Common-
wealth."3 s The court noted that the clear intent of the stat-
ute, when read along with its misdemeanor component for ab-
ductions within the Commonwealth, is to punish more severely
those offenders who withhold a child from his or her custodian
when the detention is accomplished outside of Virginia, thereby
further restricting the ability to retrieve the child. 69
The court found that despite the fact that the original deten-
tion and later removal of the child occurred outside the Com-
monwealth, the immediate harm of depriving the custodial
parent of custody of his son occurred within Virginia, specifical-
ly Fairfax County. Thus, Virginia properly exercised jurisdiction
over the defendant.37 The court also found that under Virgin-
ia Code section 18.2-49.1(A) the legislature "clearly provided
that venue exists where the crime of custodial interference
occurred, i.e., where the harm resulted as a direct and immedi-
ate consequence of the violation of the court order," which in
this case was Fairfax County.37' The aggrieved father was a
resident of Fairfax County at the time of the abduction, and
the child was to be returned to Fairfax County pursuant to a
valid and enforceable Fairfax County Circuit Court custody
order. It was clearly established that the harm contemplated by
the statute occurred in this locus. Thus, the court found that
venue in Fairfax County was proper. 2
B. Guilty Pleas
In Sandy v. Commonwealth,"3 the Virginia Court of Ap-
peals held that the Commonwealth had breached the terms of a
plea agreement and that the trial court should have granted
367. Foster-Zahid, 23 Va. App. at 436-37, 477 S.E.2d at 762.
368. Id. at 432, 477 S.E.2d at 762.
369. See id. at 437, 477 S.E.2d at 762.
370. See id. at 440-41, 477 S.E.2d at 764.
371. Id. at 442, 477 S.E.2d at 765.
372. See i&L at 442-43, 477 S.E.2d at 765.
373. 26 Va. App. 724, 496 S.E.2d 167 (Ct. App. 1998) (en banc), affg 25 Va. App.
1, 486 S.E.2d 102 (1997).
1140
CRIMINAL LAW
the defendant specific performance of his plea agreement. 4
Sandy had been charged with thirty-two felony counts of issu-
ing fraudulent grain receipts in violation of Virginia Code sec-
tion 3.1-722.28."' He and the Commonwealth's Attorney nego-
tiated a plea agreement that, if he would meet with the
prosecutor and provide her with information to her reasonable
satisfaction about activities in the county which he knew about,
she would nolle prosequi all but seven of the charges, amend
those seven to petty larceny, and recommend certain sentences
for him. Sandy met and furnished information which the prose-
cutor initially indicated satisfied her, but before the pleas could
be executed, she decided she did not believe him and declared
the agreement had been breached. Sandy moved the trial court
to order specific performance of the agreement. At the hearing,
the Commonwealth failed to produce any evidence that the
information Sandy had provided was false. The trial court ruled
that in absence of approval by the trial court, there was no
valid agreement-only a tentative acceptance of the agreement
on the part of the Commonwealth.Y
The court of appeals held that the trial court abused its dis-
cretion in refusing specific performance.377 Sandy relied to his
detriment on the agreement, had no other adequate remedy,
and wound up being convicted not only of the seven misde-
meanors the agreement had called for, but, also for seven felo-
nies as well. The Commonwealth failed to prove that Sandy
had not carried out his obligations under the agreement.378
The Virginia Court of Appeals specified that the remedy
would require the convictions be vacated and the Common-
wealth make good faith motions to amend the seven charges
and to dismiss the remaining charges. 7 A trial judge, other
than the one who heard the case before, would receive the
defendant's guilty pleas and, assuming the court accepted the
374. See id. at 725, 496 S.E.2d at 168.
375. VA. CODE ANN. § 3.1-722.28 (Repl. Vol. 1994); see Sandy v. Commonwealth, 25
Va. App. 1, 3, 486 S.E.2d 102, 103 (Ct. App. 1997).
376. See Sandy at 3-4, 8-9, 486 S.E.2d at 103-04, 106.
377. See id. at 11-12, 486 S.E.2d at 107-08.
378. See id. at 11, 486 S.E.2d at 107.
379. See Sandy v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 724, 725, 496 S.E.2d 167, 168 (Ct.
App. 1998) (en banc), affg 25 Va. App. 1, 486 S.E.2d 102 (Ct. App. 1997).
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motions, the Commonwealth would be required to make a good
faith recommendation for the sentences contemplated in the
agreement."80
In Watkins v. Commonwealth,38' the Virginia Court of Ap-
peals held that the Commonwealth was not bound by the terms
of a plea agreement after it was permitted to nolle prosequi the
charges and bring a new indictment. The court found that the
action of the trial court in entering a nolle prosequi of an in-
dictment "lays 'to rest that indictment and the underlying war-
rant without disposition [of the case], as though they had never
existed."" The new indictment is a new charge, distinct from
the original charge or indictment."
C. Trial in Defendant's Absence
In Hohman v. Commonwealth,"4 the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia affirmed the decision of the trial court, finding the defen-
dant guilty of five misdemeanors for the reasons set forth by
the Virginia Court of Appeals. The defendant had appealed his
misdemeanor convictions to the circuit court. The notice of
appeal set forth a trial date and advised the defendant that he
must be present in court on that date. Also, the notice stated
that, if the defendant was on bond and did not appear in court,
the bond may be revoked. The defendant signed the notice but
did not appear in court on the designated day. His counsel,
however, was present on the defendant's behalf. Counsel waived
a jury and agreed to a trial date. An order setting the trial
date indicated that a copy of that order was mailed to the de-
fendant. 85
The defendant was released on bond prior to trial. He signed
documentation pertaining to the conditions of release which
required him to appear in court to answer for the charged of-
fenses "at all times and places and before any court or judge to-
380. See id.
381. 27 Va. App. 473, 499 S.E.2d 589 (Ct. App. 1998) (en banc).
382. Id. at 474, 499 S.E.2d at 590 (citing Burfoot v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App.
38, 44, 473 S.E.2d 724, 727 (Ct. App. 1996)).
383. See id.
384. 255 Va. 3, 493 S.E.2d 886 (1997).
385. See Hohman v. Commonwealth, No. 0815-95-4 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 1996).
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which this case may be rescheduled, continued, transferred,
certified or appealed."' The bond agreement, which also spec-
ified his trial date, warned that the defendant's failure to ap-
pear may result in him being tried and convicted in his ab-
sence.
On the specified date of trial, the defendant was not present
in court, and on his behalf, his attorney entered pleas of "not
guilty." The defendant was found guilty, and a sentencing date
was set. The circuit court also issued a capias for the
defendant's arrest. The defendant did not appear for sentencing
but the court continued the sentencing hearing until the defen-
dant could be located. 87
The Virginia Court of Appeals, noting that the defendant did
not allege that he was unaware of the second trial date, found
that he had waived his right to be present.3  In a letter to
the trial judge, which was made a part of the record, the defen-
dant stated that he was present at the courthouse on the day
of his trial but left after he was advised that he would not be
able to plead guilty to a reduced charge. Based upon the evi-
dence, the court of appeals found that the trial court reasonably
concluded the defendant had notice of his trial date and, by his
conduct, had waived the right to be present.389 He knowingly
and voluntarily failed to appear for his trial, and consequently,
he forfeited his constitutional rights of confrontation and due
process and his statutory rights under Virginia Code section19.2-237.390
D. Juries
The Supreme Court of Virginia in Mason v. Common-
wealth,39' affirmed the rejection of a motion for a mistrial
when, during juiy deliberations, a defendant alleged that one
386. Id.
387. See id.
388. See id.
389. See id.
390. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-237 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 1998) (allowing a
court to proceed to trial in a misdemeanor case if the accused fails to appear and
plead).
391. 255 Va. 505, 498 S.E.2d 921 (1998).
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juror had insufficient proficiency in the English language to
provide him a fair trial. The trial judge questioned the juror on
the record when the motion for a mistrial was made. The su-
preme court held that the record supported the trial judge's
conclusion that the juror was qualified to sit."
E. Jury Selection
In Lilly v. Commonwealth,393 the Supreme Court of Virginia
held that a relative of the chief investigator in a criminal case
was not automatically disqualified from serving on the jury."
Although prior case law had held that crime victims were anal-
ogous to parties to litigation in the sense that their relatives
were per se disqualified from jury service, 3" the court de-
clined to extend the same reasoning to police investigators.3
F. Jury Instructions
The Supreme Court of Virginia in Turner v. Common-
wealth,97 affimed the defendant's conviction for first degree
murder, thereby rejecting his challenge to the trial court's re-
fusal to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of vol-
untary manslaughter.398 The court affirmed the decision of the
Virginia Court of Appeals399 which found that the refusal of
the instruction, if error, was harmless because the jury was in-
structed on the lesser-included offense of second degree murder
and rejected it by finding the defendant guilty of first degree
murder.' The court of appeals concluded that by rejecting
the option of second degree murder, the jury necessarily reject-
ed the factual basis upon which it might have rendered a ver-
dict on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter
392. See id. at 510, 498 S.E.2d at 924.
393. 255 Va. 558, 449 S.E.2d 522 (1998).
394. See id. at 569-70, 449 S.E.2d at 530-31.
395. See Gray v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 591, 593-94, 311 S.E.2d 409, 410 (1984);
Jacques v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. (10 Gratt.) 690, 695 (1853).
396. See Lilly, 255 Va. at 570, 499 S.E.2d at 531.
397. 255 Va. 1, 492 S.E.2d 447 (1997).
398. See id. at 1, 492 S.E.2d at 447.
399. See id.
400. See id.
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which, like second degree murder, must fall when premeditation
is found.40 ' Because premeditation is an element of first de-
gree murder and cannot co-exist with reasonable provocation,
which is an element of voluntary manslaughter, the court of
appeals concluded that, assuming the trial court erred in failing
to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter, the error was
harmless because it could not have affected the verdict.4 2
G. Reopening Cases
In Jackson v. Commonwealth,4 "3 the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia upheld a trial court's exercise of discretion in allowing the
Commonwealth to reopen its case and to present the testimony
of an additional witness after the defendant moved to strike the
Commonwealth's evidence.4
VIII. SENTENCING
A. Enhanced Punishment for Second or Subsequent Offense
In Thomas v. Commonwealth,0 5 the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia addressed the question of whether section 46.2-357(B)(3)
of the Virginia Code40" subjects the defendant to an enhanced
penalty for a subsequent offense if, at the time of the commis-
sion of the subject offense, the defendant has not actually been
"convicted" of the earlier offense. As a preliminary matter, the
court rejected the defendant's claim that Virginia Code section
46.2-357(B)(3) was unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous.4"7
The court found that the challenged phrase "second or subse-
quent such offense" was neither vague nor ambiguous.4
401. See Turner v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 270, 277, 476 S.E.2d 504, 508 (Ct.
App. 1996).
402. See id. at 270, 476 S.E.2d at 504.
403. 255 Va. 625, 499 S.E.2d 538 (1998).
404. See id. at 645, 499 S.E.2d at 550.
405. 256 Va. 38, 501 S.E.2d 391 (1998).
406. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-357(B)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1998) (allowing for enhanced
penalty for a subsequent offense while driving, after having been determined to be an
habitual offender).
407. See Thomas, 256 Va. at 41-42, 501 S.E.2d at 392.
408. Id.
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There was no need to resort to legislative history to construe
the clear language of the statute because there was no ambigu-
ity.
4 09
The court further found that the legislature's choice of the
word "offense" rather than the word "conviction" made clear its
intent to authorize "punishment enhancement without a prior
conviction."41 The court noted that the purpose of section
46.2-357 "is to deter criminal conduct by punishing those who
repeatedly drive after having been declared an habitual offend-
er, rather than to reform habitual offenders."41' That being
the case, the only logical interpretation is that a prior "offense"
is all that is necessary to trigger the enhanced punishment
under the statute.412
B. Costs
In Ohree v. Commonwealth,41 the Virginia Court of Appeals
upheld Virginia's statutory scheme for recoupment of jury fees,
court appointed attorney's fees, and other fees and costs from
convicted indigent defendants.4 4 Ohree had been indicted for
welfare fraud and moved the circuit court to excuse her from
the obligation to pay jurors' fees in the event that she was
convicted.415 When the circuit court refused, she objected, but
waived trial by jury. Upon conviction, she was ordered, over her
objection and as a condition of suspended sentence, to pay stan-
dard court costs, including her court appointed attorney's fee,
the clerk's fee, the Commonwealth's Attorney's fee, and other
appropriate fees.41 6
The court of appeals rejected her claim that the requirement
to pay jurors' fees unconstitutionally prevented her from exer-
cising her right to a jury trial, finding that only unnecessary
409. See id.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 42, 501 S.E.2d at 393.
412. See id.
413. 26 Va. App. 299, 494 S.E.2d 484 (Ct. App. 1998).
414. See id. at 312, 494 S.E.2d at 491 (discussing VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-336).
415. See id. at 303, 494 S.E.2d at 486.
416. See id.
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burdens on that right violate the Constitution.417 The court
found this particular provision was necessary to reimburse the
public for the expenditure which her conduct necessitated.4 "8
Because the statutory scheme was not unconstitutional, the
court determined that she voluntarily waived her right to a
jury trial to avoid the expense of jurors' fees. '
Ohree's challenge to the assessment of other costs as viola-
tive of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses was held
procedurally defaulted for failure to raise those arguments in
the trial court and, alternately, without merit."m Because the
purpose of assessing costs was simply to reimburse the public
for the cost of the defendant's trial and because the statutory
scheme provided for extensions of time or excuse of payment for
those who genuinely are unable to pay costs, the scheme did
not violate the Constitution.42'
C. Jury Recommendations
Two Virginia Court of Appeals decisions addressed the issue
of what type of mitigation evidence is admissible for jury coi-
sideration in the penalty phase of Virginia's recently enacted
bifurcated jury trial procedure.4" In Shifflett v. Common-
wealth,4m  the court held that the testimony of the employer
concerning the defendant's good work record and attempts to
schedule transportation to work so he would not have to drive
as an habitual offender as well as the testimony of the
defendant's girlfriend that he "was a responsible father who
worked earnestly to provide for his children" should have been
admitted.4" The court reasoned that the defendant's character
and habits were relevant for sentencing purposes.4 2 On the
417. See id. at 312-13, 494 S.E.2d at 491.
418. See id. The court assumed that she had standing to raise this issue in light
of her waiver of jury trial, resulting in the absence of assessment of such fees. See
id.
419. See id. at 313, 494 S.E.2d at 491.
420. See id. at 313-16, 494 S.E.2d at 491-92.
421. See 1d.
422. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 1998).
423. 26 Va. App. 254, 494 S.E.2d 163 (Ct. App. 1997) (en banc).
424. Id. at 260-61, 494 S.E.2d at 166.
425. See id.
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other hand, in Caudill v. Commonwealth,426 the court held
that evidence that the defendant's wife had a medical condition
and was dependent on him for transportation to her treatments
fell under the well established rule427 that the impact of the
defendant's prospective punishment on his family is not legiti-
mate mitigation evidence.4'
IX. POST-TRIAL MATTERS
A. Expungement
The Supreme Court of Virginia clarified the parameters of
eligibility for expungement in Commonwealth v. Jackson.'
Jackson pled nolo contendere to a charge of larceny by conceal-
ment of merchandise. The trial court deferred judgment for a
probationary period, then dismissed her charge. She sought
expungement in circuit court under Virginia Code section 19.2-
392.2."o The Commonwealth, citing Gregg v. Common-
wealth,43' contended that she was not eligible for
expungement because she was not innocent.432 The circuit
court distinguished this case from Gregg because Jackson had
pled nolo contendere rather than guilty and granted
expungement."3 The supreme court reversed, holding that the
determinative factor was not how Jackson had pled, but that
the trial court had found sufficient evidence to find her guilty
of the crime charged, and therefore, she could not be regarded
as innocent and eligible for expungement.' In a footnote, the
court questioned the trial court's authority to defer disposition
and then dismiss her charges because Virginia Code section
19.2-303.2,' 3' authorizing such dispositions, expressly excludes
426. 27 Va. App. 81, 497 S.E.2d 513 (Ct. App. 1998).
427. See Coppola v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 243, 254, 257 S.E.2d 797, 804 (1979).
428. See Caudill, 27 Va. App. at 81, 497 S.E.2d at 513.
429. 255 Va. 552, 499 S.E.2d 276 (1998).
430. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-392.2 (Repl. Vol. 1995); see Jackson 255 Va. at 554-55,
499 S.E.2d at 277-78.
431. 227 Va. 504, 316 S.E.2d 741 (1984).
432. See id.; Jackson, 255 Va. at 554, 499 S.E.2d at 277-78.
433. See Jackson, 255 Va. at 555, 499 S.E.2d at 277-78.
434. See id. at 555-57, 499 S.E.2d at 278-279.
435. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-303.2 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
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larceny offenses.4' The court noted, however, that the Com-
monwealth had not raised this issue in the lower courts."7
B. Probation Revocations
In two opinions involving the same defendant and the same
set of facts, two panels of the Virginia Court of Appeals clari-
fied the meaning of the universal probation condition' that a
defendant "be of good behavior." In both Holden v. Common-
wealth cases,"9 the defendant pled guilty to sexual offenses
against children. The Loudoun County Circuit Court imprisoned
him on some counts and, pursuant to a plea agreement, took
his guilty pleas on other counts under advisement pending his
completion of a probationary period when he is released from
prison.' 4 The Fairfax County Circuit Court had given him an
active prison sentence with additional time suspended." A
common condition of both probationary dispositions was that-
the defendant "be of good behavior." 2 While serving his pris-
on sentence, Holden was caught writing letters to a "pen pal"
whom he had contacted through an advertisement in the back
of a magazine. The letters he wrote and the letters he had re-
ceived from the pen pal discussed in salacious terms the
authors' desires and future plans to engage in the sexual abuse
of children. 3 Both trial courts had revoked Holden's proba-
tion, holding that these correspondences did not constitute good
behavior.'
On appeal, Holden contended in both cases that the "good
behavior" requirement was violated only if he committed new
436. See Jackson, 255 Va. at 555 n.1, 499 S.E.2d at 278 n.1.
437. See id.
438. This condition is implied by law, even when it is not expressly stated. See
Coffey v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 760, 167 S.E.2d 343 (1969).
439. 27 Va. App. 38, 497 S.E.2d 492 (Ct. App. 1998); 26 Va. App. 403, 494 S.E.2d
892 (Ct. App. 1998).
440. See Holden, 26 Va. App. at 405-06, 494 S.E.2d at 894.
441. See Holden, 27 Va. App. at 40-41, 497 S.E.2d at 493.
442. Holden, 26 Va. App. at 405-06, 494 S.E.2d at 894.
443. See Holden, 27 Va. App. at 40-41, 497 S.E.2d at 493.
444. See id.
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violations of law, and because the letters were not illegal,"5
they could not justify revocation of his probation."6
In the Fairfax County case, Holden argued that the order
suspending his sentence had not given him fair notice under
the Due Process Clause that such behavior would be regarded
as a violation."7 The court of appeals rejected Holden's argu-
ments, ruling that the "good behavior" requirement was violated
not only by new criminal offenses but by any "substantial mis-
conduct," which included Holden's correspondences.' The
court further held in the Fairfax County case that Holden had
not only fair notice, but also actual knowledge and that his
letters were a violation of the terms of his probation."9
In the Loudoun County case, Holden argued that the letters
were prptected speech under the First Amendment and, thus,
could not be grounds for probation revocation.450 The court
held that his obscene letter writing enjoyed no First Amend-
ment protection.45'
X. JUVENILES
A. Juvenile Jurisdiction
In Winston v. Commonwealth,452 the Virginia Court of Ap-
peals dealt with an unusual problem in court jurisdiction, re-
garding defendants who are near the age of majority. Upon
arrest, Winston told the police that he was eighteen years old;
therefore, he was charged as an adult with felonies. At trial in
the circuit court, he told the court that he was nineteen and
gave a date of birth which would have made him an adult at
445. But see 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1994) (sending obscene letters through the mail is
a federal felony). The case had not, however, been heard in the trial courts on the
theory that this was a federal crime.
446. See Holden, 26 Va. App. at 408-10, 494 S.E.2d at 895.
447. See Holden, 27 Va. App. at 44-46, 497 S.E.2d at 495.
448. See id. at 42-44, 497 S.E.2d at 493-95.
449. See id. at 44-46, 497 S.E.2d at 495-96.
450. See Holden 26 Va. App. at 409-10, 494 S.E.2d at 895.
451. See id. at 409, 494 S.E.2d at 895.
452. 26 Va. App. 746, 497 S.E.2d 141 (Ct. App. 1998).
1150
CRIMINAL LAW
the time of the crimes. At his sentencing hearing, his mother
also testified that he was an adult.45
While his convictions were on appeal, Winston began claim-
ing that he was born in 1978 rather than 1976 and that he had
been a juvenile at the time of the crimes. He moved to vacate
his convictions for lack of jurisdiction. The court of appeals
remanded the case to the circuit court to conduct an evidentiary
hearing on Winston's age. 4
At the evidentiary hearing, Winston presented certain docu-
mentary evidence which he claimed proved that he had been
born in 1978, but neither he nor his mother recanted their
earlier testimony that he had been an adult at the time of the
crimes.4" The circuit court found that it could not determine
Winston's age from his new evidence but found that, based on
earlier testimony, he had been an adult at the time of the
crimes.456
Winston appealed again, and the court of appeals af-
firmed.457 The court rejected Winston's claim that the circuit
court, by finding that it could not determine his age from his
evidence, had disregarded the higher court's instructions to
decide the issue.45 The court held that the burden of proving
lack of jurisdiction is on the party attacking jurisdiction.459
The circuit court simply held that Winston had not borne this
burden to prove that he had been an adult at the time of the
crimes. Finding the evidence sufficient to support the lower
court's judgment, the court of appeals affirmed.4"
B. Juvenile Sentencing
The Virginia Court of Appeals in Suleiman v.. Common-
wealth, 1 decided an issue of first impression concerning the
453. See id. at 749-50, 497 S.E.2d at 143-44.
454. See id.
455. See id.
456. See id.
457. See id. at 758, 497 S.E.2d at 148.
458. See id. at 753.
459. See id. at 752, 497 S.E.2d at 144-45.
460. See id. at 758, 487 S.E.2d at 148.
461. 26 Va. App. 506, 495 S.E.2d 532 (Ct. App. 1998).
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written findings necessary to sentence a juvenile under Virginia
Code section 16.1-285.1462 as a serious juvenile offender.'
Suleiman appealed to the circuit court his juvenile disposition
for robbery, and the circuit court found him guilty and sen-
tenced him under Virginia Code section 16.1-285.1 as a serious
juvenile offender.' The dispositional order contained express
findings that he was over fourteen at the time of the offense,
that he committed an offense that would, if committed by an
adult, be a felony punishable by more than twenty years in
prison, and that his commitment as a serious juvenile offender
was necessary to meet the rehabilitative needs of the juve-
nile.' Suleiman contended that the order was defective in
-that it did not also contain a finding that the defendant was
not a proper person to receive treatment through juvenile pro-
grams other than incarceration.4'
The court of appeals analyzed the language of Virginia Code
section 16.1-285.1(A)' 7 and noted that the only express find-
ings the statute requires are those stated in the circuit court
order as summarized above.' The statute also requires that
the commitment order "be supported by a determination that
the ... juvenile is not a proper person to receive treatment or
rehabilitation through other juvenile programs or facilities" but
that no express written finding to this effect is required.'
The court found that the circuit court's statement that "commit-
ment under this section is necessary to meet the rehabilitative
needs of the juvenile" implicitly reflected a finding that he was
not a proper person to receive treatment through other juvenile
alternatives.470 The court then analyzed the record to reject
his contention that the evidence did not support these find-
ings.471
462. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-285.1 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
463. See Suleiman, 26 Va. App. at 510-13, 495 S.E.2d at 535-37.
464. See id. at 508-10, 495 S.E.2d at 533-34. A
465. See id. at 511, 495 S.E.2d at 535.
466. See id. at 510, 495 S.E.2d at 534.
467. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-285.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 1996).
468. See Suleiman, 26 Va. App. at 511, 495 S.E.2d at 535.
469. Id.
470. Id.
471. See id. at 511-13, 495 S.E.2d at 535-36.
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C. Transfer Procedures
The Supreme Court of Virginia addressed juvenile transfer
procedures in Jackson v. Commonwealth.472 Jackson, a juve-
nile, was transferred for trial as an adult and did not appeal
the transfer decision. The circuit court issued indictments with-
out first reviewing the transfer papers from the juvenile court
in accordance with the requirements of Virginia Code section
16.1-269.647' that was in effect in September, 1994. The cir-
cuit court later conducted the review, entered an order directing
the Commonwealth to obtain indictments, and issued a super-
seding set of indictments.474 Jackson contended that the cir-
cuit court should have quashed the earlier set of indictments,
and the Commonwealth contended that no review of the trans-
fer papers was necessary because Jackson had not appealed the
transfer decision.475 The supreme court held that the Virginia
Code at that time required a review of the transfer papers even
when the transfer decision was not appealed, but observed that
subsequent legislation had amended Virginia Code section 16.1-
269.6(B) so as to require such review only when the transfer
has been appealed.47
Jackson further contended that the circuit court never ac-
quired jurisdiction to try him because it did not conduct the
transfer review until nine months after the transfer order and,
thus, failed to act on the transfer order within a reasonable
time. The supreme court, citing Jamborsky v. Baskins, 77 held
that although conducting the transfer review was jurisdictional,
the time within which it was conducted was not. The -court
found the nine-month delay unreasonable but not prejudicial to
Jackson. The court further held that, even during the period
when the circuit court had no jurisdiction to try Jackson be-
cause it had not yet conducted the transfer review, Jackson's
concurrences in the continuances had waived his rights to a
speedy trial under Virginia Code section 19.2-243. 478
472. 255 Va. 625, 499 S.E.2d 538 (1998).
473. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.6 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cure. Supp. 1998).
474. See Jackson, 255 Va. at 631-32, 499 S.E.2d at 542-43.
475. See id.
476. See id.
477. 247 Va. 506, 442 S.E.2d 636 (1994).
478. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-243 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 1998); see Jackson
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In Panameno v. Commonwealth,47 the Supreme Court of
Virginia ruled that, upon transferring a juvenile to circuit court
for trial as an adult, the juvenile court need not make an ex-
plicit finding that he is competent to stand trial unless his
competency has been challenged. The court was guided by the
1994 enactment of Virginia Code section 16.1-269.1(A)(3),'
which establishes a presumption of competency and places the
burden of proof of incompetency on the challenging party, in
place of former Virginia Code section 16.1-269, which required
an explicit finding in the transfer order that the juvenile was
competent to stand trial.48'
XI. APPEAMS
A. Appeals De Novo
In Zamani v. Commonwealth, 2 the Virginia Court of Ap-
peals had occasion to resolve an unusual conflict of jurisdiction
between a circuit court and a general district court. Zamani
had been convicted in general district court of two misdemeanor
offenses and timely appealed to the circuit court. More than ten
days after the judgment had been entered in the district court,
and after the circuit court had set a trial date but before trial
*de novo in the circuit court had commenced, the district court
granted Zamani's motion under Virginia Code section 16.1-
133.141 to reopen his case.' On rehearing, the district
court found sufficient evidence to convict him but withheld
judgment and took his case under advisement for one year.'
Zamani then appeared in circuit court and withdrew his appeal,
but the circuit court held that the district court had lost juris-
diction to reopen the case when ten days had elapsed from the
date of the original judgment in district court.' The circuit
255 Va. 642-44, 538 S.E.2d at 548-50.
479. 255 Va. 473, 498 S.E.2d 920 (1998).
480. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1(AX3) (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 1998).
481. See Panameno, 255 Va. at 475, 498 S.E.2d at 921.
482. 26 Va. App. 59, 492 S.E.2d 854 (Ct. App. 1997).
483. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-133.1 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cure. Supp. 1998).
484. See Zamani, 26 Va. App. at 61, 492 S.E.2d at 855.
485. See id.
486. See id.
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court further held that, because he was withdrawing his appeal,
it must affirm the original judgment of the district court under
Virginia Code section 16.1-133." -
The court of appeals applied the rule of statutory construc-
tion whereby two statutes which are closely interrelated must
be read together and effect must be given to all of their provi-
sions.' The court noted that neither section 16.1-133.1, which
authorizes a district court to reopen a case within sixty days
after judgment, nor sections 16.1-132 and 16.1-133, which pro-
vide for automatic appeal and trial de novo in the circuit court
if appeal is noted within ten days of the district court's judg-
ment, "contains language indicating that the exercise of one
right limits or precludes the exercise of the other."489 The
court concluded that if a district court reopens a defendant's
case before his trial de novo has actually begun in circuit court,
the clerk of the circuit court must send the papers of the case
back to the district court; thus, the district court has jurisdic-
tion to reconsider the case. Consequently, the defendant need
not withdraw his appeal in circuit court.490
B. Record on Appeal
In Watkins v. Commonwealth,491 the Virginia Court of Ap-
peals rejected the Commonwealth's position on the scope of the
writ of certiorari under Virginia Code section 8.01-675.4.492
The court held that this writ could be used to direct the trial
court to supply a missing transcript which had not been made
a part of the record on appeal in accordance with Rules 5A:7
arid 5A:8 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia.49
Watkins, indicted for burglary and related offenses, had
waived representation by counsel and elected to represent him-
487. See id. at 65, 492 S.E.2d at 855.
488. See id. at 63, 492 S.E.2d at 856-57 (citing Board of Supervisors v. Marshall,
215 Va. 756, 761, 214 S.E.2d 146, 150 (1975); ACB Trucking, Inc. v. Griffin, 5 Va.
App. 542, 547-48, 365 S.E.2d 334, 337-38 (Ct. App. 1988)).
489. Id. at 63, 492 S.E.2d at 856.
490. See id. at 65-66, 492 S.E.2d at 858.
491. 26 Va. App. 335, 494 S.E.2d 859 (Ct. App. 1998).
492. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-675.4 (Repl. Vol. 1992 & Cum. Supp. 1998).
493. See Watkins, 26 Va. App. at 340-43, 494 S.E.2d at 862-63.
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self in a hearing memorialized by court order but for which
there was no transcript in the record on appeal. The court of
appeals issued a writ of certiorari directing the trial court to
supply the missing transcript. The Commonwealth moved to
vacate the writ, arguing that it could be used only to supply
items which already had been properly made a part of the
record on appeal as defined by Rules 5A:7 and 5A:8 of the
Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia. The Commonwealth
maintained that, because the burden is on the appellant to
show that the judgment of the trial court is incorrect, the ab-
sence of the crucial transcript must redound against him.4"
The court of appeals acknowledged that the Commonwealth's
position found some support in Washingtols v. Common-
wealth,495 but held that subsequent case law from the Su-
preme Court of Virginia495 had implicitly overruled Washing-
ton.49' The court further held that the use of.the writ of cer-
tiorari could actually enlarge the record on appeal to include
items not originally included therein.498 Finally, the court de-
termined that enlargement of the record was necessary in this
case because waiver of the right to counsel could not be pre-
sumed from a silent record, and thus, the absence of the tran-
script showing waiver would, in this situation, redound against
the Commonwealth, not the appellant.
499
C. Commonwealth's Appeals to the Supreme Court of Virginia
In the first appeal heard by the Supreme Court of Virginia in
Commonwealth v. Jenkins,"°' the court reversed the decision
of the Virginia Court of Appeals and reinstated Jenkins' convic-
tions for first degree murder and use of a firearm during the
commission of murder. The issue before the supreme court was
whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that the victim
died from gunshot wounds infficted by Jenkins. The defendant
494. See id. at 340, 494 S.E.2d at 862.
495. 216 Va. 185, 217 S.E.2d 815 (1975).
496. See, e.g., Buck v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 449, 443 S.E.2d 414 (1994); Godfrey
v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 460, 317 S.E.2d 781 (1984).
497. See Watkins, 26 Va. App. at 340-42, 494 S.E.2d at 862.
498. See id.
499. See id.
500. 255 Va. 516, 499 S.E.2d 263 (1998).
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fired several gunshots at the victim, inflicting three wounds.
The victim was transported to the hospital and treated for his
injuries, which included emergency surgery to repair his colon.
He died four days later, never having left the hospital."0 '
At a jury trial, the medical examiner who performed the
autopsy on the victim testified concerning the specifics of the
three gunshot wounds sustained by the victim. He stated that
the victim had aspirated vomit because there was vomit in his
"airway" and lungs. When asked whether he had an opinion as
to the cause of death, the medical examiner stated that the
victim died "as a result of this aspiration following the gunshot
wound to the abdomen.""2
A surgical resident who treated the victim testified that the
victim appeared to have been in good health before he was
shot. The resident testified that the day of the victim's death,
he noticed that the victim was "markedly pale and sweating
profusely."5" The victim, who was lying on his back, began
vomiting. The resident rolled the victim onto his side. Once the
victim stopped vomiting, the resident rolled him back to his
original position. The victim stopped breathing and died shortly
thereafter.'
The resident added that, at the time of victim's death, he
may have had "some type of seizure activity."50 5 He acknowl-
edged that he was not a neurologist but simply saw "some
spastic movements in his extremities."0 6 He also could not of-
fer an opinion concerning whether the victim had actually had
a seizure.50
7
The defendant offered as evidence the typewritten discharge
summary dictated and signed by the resident. A handwritten
note which appeared on the top margin of the first page stated:
501. See id. at 518, 499 S.E.2d at 264.
502. Id.
503. Id.
504. See id. at 518-19, 499 S.E.2d at 264.
505. Id.
506. Id. at 519, 499 S.E.2d at 264.
507. See id.
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Many Factors contributed to his death but all were result of
Gun Shot wound
Bowel injury and contamination
Extensive laparotomy
Intubated.5°s
No witness testified regarding the note or its origin, and de-
fense counsel did not request that the handwritten portion be
excluded.5"
The supreme court noted that "[wihen a defendant has in-
flicted wounds upon a victim that result in an affliction or
disease the defendant is criminally responsible for the victim's
death from that affliction or disease if the wounds caused the
death indirectly through a chain of natural effects and caus-
es." 1' The evidence showed that the victim was in good
health prior to being shot. The medical examiner opined that
he "died as a result of [the] aspiration following the gunshot
wound to the abdomen."51" ' Additionally, the handwritten nota-
tion on the discharge summary, introduced into evidence by the
defendant, specified that "[many factors contributed to
[Jackson's] death but all were [the] result of Gun Shot
wound.""2 Based upon this evidence, the court found that the
evidence proved the required causal connection between the
defendant's acts and the victim's death, and the jury's finding
that the victim died as a result of the gunshot wounds inflicted
by the defendant was correct."'
508. Id.
509. See id.
510. Id. at 521, 499 S.E.2d at 265.
511. Id. at 524, 499 S.E.2d at 266.
512. Id. The court noted that because the defendant offered the discharge summary
as evidence and did not request that the handwritten portion be excluded, he waived
any later objection to it being considered by the jury. Consequently, the court also
found that the court of appeals erred when it refused to consider that evidence when
evaluating whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. See id. at
521-22, 499 S.E.2d at 266.
513. See id.
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XII. MISCELLANEOUS
A. Judgments
In Myers v. Commonwealth,514 the decision of a panel of the
Virginia Court of Appeals to dismiss an appeal reemphasized
the necessity for appellants to correct errors in judgments be-
fore they become final. In 1992, Myers was charged with mur-
der in violation of Virginia Code section 18.2-32. and felony
child neglect. In a bench trial, the court expressly found her not
guilty of first degree murder but found her guilty of second
degree felony murder.516
The conviction order stated that Myers had been convicted of
second degree murder under Virginia Code section 18.2-32.
Myers appealed her conviction, arguing that the evidence had
been insufficient to support a conviction of felony murder under
Virginia Code section 18.2-33."' In 1995 in an unpublished,
en banc opinion, the court of appeals had held that Myers was
precluded from appellate relief because she had failed to chal-
lenge her conviction under Virginia Code section 18.2-32 which
was the correct statute.58 The Supreme Court of Virginia had
upheld that decision, also in an unpublished judgment."9
Myers then invoked Virginia Code section 8.01-428(B) 20 to
persuade the trial court to correct its 1992 judgment order to
reflect that her conviction had actually been under Virginia
Code section 18.2-33, not 18.2-32.521 Subsequently, she again
sought on appeal to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the conviction. The court of appeals dismissed her ap-
peal because the proceeding under Virginia Code section 8.01-
428(B) merely had enabled the trial court to correct a clerical
error. The proceeding did not reinvest the trial court with juris-
514. 26 Va. App. 544, 496 S.E.2d 80 (Ct. App. 1998).
515. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-32 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 1998).
516. See Myers, 26 Va. App. at 546, 496 S.E.2d at 81. The child neglect charge
was dismissed. See id.
517. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-33 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 1998).
518. See Myers, 26 Va. App. at 546, 496 S.E.2d at 81.
519. See id.
520. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-428(B) (Repl. Vol. 1992 & Cum. Supp. 1998).
521. See Myers, 26 Va. App. at 546, 496 S.E.2d at 81.
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diction to vacate its earlier judgment or to enter in its place a
new judgment which could then be appealed. Because the prior
judgment had become final in 1992, it could not now be ap-
pealed.5"
B. Statutory Construction
In Waldrop v. Commonwealth,5" the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia applied two familiar principles of statutory construction to
reverse and dismiss a conviction for perjury. Waldrop was an
elected public official whose alleged perjury consisted of failing
to report on his campaign finance disclosure form two donations
given to defray his legal expenses in withstanding a recount
proceeding after his election. The case turned on whether these
donations were "campaign contributions" within the meaning of
that term in the former Fair Elections Practices Act.5" The
court looked to the 1993 recodification of that law as the Cam-
paign Finance Disclosure Act52 which made clear that cam-
paign contributions were only those given to -a candidate "for
the purpose of influencing the outcome of an election."5"
Applying the principle that a recodification of a statute is
presumed not to intend any substantive change in the law
unless a contrary intent plainly appears in the statute, the
court held that the definition of campaign contributions also
applied under the prior law and that the money in question
had not been given to influence the outcome of an election
because the election had been concluded. 27 The court further
held that, at the very least, the old law had been ambiguous as
to whether such contributions must be reported and that, be-
cause failure to do so was a criminal offense, the defendant was
entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt about the
statute's construction.528
522. See Myers, 26 Va. App. at 548-49, 496 S.E.2d at 82-83.
523. 255 Va. 210, 495 S.E.2d 822 (1998).
524. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.1-257 (repealed 1993).
525. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 24.2-900 to 24.2-930 (Repl. Vol. 1997 & Cum. Supp. 1998).
526. Id. § 24.2-901(A) (Repl. Vol. 1997).
527. See Waldrop, 255 Va. at 214, 495 S.E.2d at 824-25.
528. See id. at 214-15, 495 S.E.2d at 824-25.
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C. Jurisdiction and Void/Voidable Orders
In Holden v. Commonwealth,5" a panel of the Virginia
Court of Appeals wrestled with, and did not quite resolve, the
issue of whether a court may defer a finding of guilt and grant
"probation before judgment" in cases other than those where
such a disposition is authorized by statute.30 Holden had
been indicted for multiple counts of sexual offenses against
children and made a plea agreement whereby he pled guilty to
several offenses. Holden was sentenced to active prison time for
some counts, and a finding of guilt on the others would be
deferred pending his successful completion of a probationary
period after release from prison. 3' Conviction and sentence
subsequently were imposed in the cases where judgment had
been withheld based on his misconduct while in prison. Holden
did not object on procedural grounds in the trial court but con-
tended on appeal that the trial court had lost jurisdiction when
it adopted the "probation before judgment" disposition, which
was not authorized by the Virginia Code or by common law. 32
The court of appeals unequivocally rejected the jurisdictional
argument, holding that "[a] contrary result would deem jurisdic-
tional a mere procedural deviation, resulting in the unwarrant-
ed nullification of consent judgments."5" The court gave mixed
signals, however, on whether this dispositional practice -would
be deemed erroneous if objections to it were preserved properly
in the trial court. While apparently characterizing it in the pas-
sage quoted above as a "procedural deviation," the court else-
where stated that "this practice is authorized" " but cited on-
ly Virginia Code sections 19.2-2985" and 19.2-303. 53s
529. 26 Va. App. 403, 494 S.E.2d 892 (Ct. App. 1998).
530. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-278.8(4), (4a) (Cam. Supp. 1998) (certain juvenile
offenders); 18.2-251 (Cum. Supp. 1998) (first offense simple possession of drugs); 19.2-
303.2 (Rep. Vol. 1995) (certain misdemeanor property offenders).
531. See Holden, 26 Va. App. at 405-06, 494 S.E.2d at 893-94.
532. See id. at 406-07, 494 S.E.2d at 895.
533. Id. at 408, 494 S.E.2d at 895.
534. Id. at 407, 494 S.E.2d at 894.
535. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-298 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cam. Supp. 1998) (sentence
pronounced, or imposition of sentence suspended, after finding of guilty (emphasis
added)).
536. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-303 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cm. Supp. 1998) (probation
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XIII. LEGISLATION
In 1998, there were only a few major legislative develop-
ments in the field of criminal law. Although a complete summa-
ry of all enactments would be prohibitively long, some of the
more important ones are summarized below.
Chapter 892 of the Acts of Assembly amends Virginia Code
section 18.2-152.4 to add halting or disabling of computer data,
programs, or software to the crime of computer trespass. 7
Chapter 821 of the Acts of Assembly amends Virginia Code
sections 18.2-95 and 18.2-108.1 to reconcile the penalties for
larceny of a firearm as not less than one year or more than
twenty years in prison.5"
Chapter 825 of the Acts of Assembly enacts new Virginia
Code section 18.2-370.01 to create a new class one misdemeanor
when a juvenile over the age of thirteen knowingly and with
lascivious intent exposes his or her sexual or genital parts to a
child under the age of fourteen and more than five years the
defendant's junior."
Chapter 579 of the Acts of Assembly adds a new Virginia
Code section 18.2-74.2 which prohibits partial birth abortions
except when necessary to save the life of the mother and pro-
vides that a violation is a class one misdemeanor.mo
Chapter 251 of the Acts of Assembly amends Virginia Code
section 19.2-398 to recognize the Commonwealth's right to ap-
peal criminal cases from the Virginia Court of Appeals to the
Supreme Court of Virginia.54'
Chapter 887 of the Acts of Assembly amends Virginia Code
section 18.2-31 to create a subsection 12, defining a new catego-
ry of capital murder, consisting of the willful, deliberate, and
after conviction).
537. See Act of May 19, 1998, ch. 892, 1998 Va. Acts 2507.
538. See Act of Apr. 22, 1998, ch. 821, 1998 Va. Acts 2011.
539. See Act of Apr. 22, 1998, ch. 825, 1998 Va. Acts 2013.
540. See Act of Apr. 15, 1998, ch. 579, 1998 Va. Acts 1366-67.
541. See Act of Apr. 7, 1998, ch. 251, 1998 Va. Acts 375.
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premeditated killing of a child under the age of fourteen by an
adult over the age of twenty-one. 2 -
542. See Act of Apr. 22, 1998, ch. 887, 1998 Va. Acts 2242.
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